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Abstract
As the amount of information exchanged through the network grows, so does the de-
mand for increased security over the transmission of this information. As the growth of
computers increased in the past few decades, more sophisticated methods of cryptography
have been developed. One method of transmitting data securely over the network is by
using symmetric-key cryptography. However, a drawback of symmetric-key cryptography
is the need to exchange the shared key securely. One of the solutions is to use public-key
cryptography.
One of the modern public-key cryptography algorithms is called Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy (ECC). The advantage of ECC over some older algorithms is the smaller number of
key sizes to provide a similar level of security. As a result, implementations of ECC are much
faster and consume fewer resources. In order to achieve better performance, ECC operations
are often offloaded onto hardware to alleviate the workload from the servers’ processors.
The most important and complex operation in ECC schemes is the elliptic curve point
multiplication (ECPM). This thesis explores the implementation of hardware accelerators
that offload the ECPM operation to hardware. These processors are referred to as ECC pro-
cessors, or simply ECPs. This thesis targets the efficient hardware implementation of ECPs
specifically for the 15 elliptic curves recommended by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST).
The main contribution of this thesis is the implementation of highly efficient hardware for
scalable and unified finite field arithmetic units that are used in the design of ECPs. In this
thesis, scalability refers to the processor’s ability to support multiple key sizes without the
need to reconfigure the hardware. By doing so, the hardware does not need to be redesigned
for the server to handle different levels of security. Unified refers to the ability of the ECP
to handle both prime and binary fields. The resultant designs are valuable to the research
community and industry, as a single hardware device is able to handle a wide range of ECC
operations efficiently and at high speeds. Thus, improving the ability of network servers to
handle secure transaction more quickly and improve productivity at lower costs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The growth of secure online transactions in recent years has created a demand for higher
security needs for information transmitted over the Internet, which requires servers of online
service providers to process a large number data coming from all the users. In addition, in
today’s fast-paced society, increasing security at the expense of the users’ long wait times
for the information to be processed is not desirable. Thus, this thesis looks to improve on
the current cryptographic processors to provide a high-speed and secured communication
channel for data transmission.
One of the protocols used to establish such a secure channel is the Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) or its successor Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [1]. The SSL protocol can be
separated into two stages: handshaking and bulk-data. In the handshaking stage, the client
and the server exchange messages in order to establish a shared secret key using public-key
cryptography. The shared secret key is in turn used in the bulk-data stage, which uses private-
key cryptography. Generally, public-key cryptography is only used during the handshaking
stage due to its computational complexity compared to private-key cryptography. However,
even though SSL reduces the number of public-key cryptographic operations by transmit-
ting data using private-key cryptography and by supporting reuse of previously established
keys, public-key cryptography is still the most time consuming operation in the transmission
channel [2]. Thus, in order to accelerate processing of the public-key cryptography opera-
tions, secure server systems offload these complex operations into faster running hardware
platforms, such as SSL accelerator cards or standalone SSL processing units [3]. Companies,
such as Elliptic Technologies1 and Broadcom2, have created such products that either support
1http://www.elliptictech.com/
2http://www.broadcom.com/
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Table 1.1: Comparison between ECC and RSA Security [13]
Symmetric ECC RSA Protection Lifetime
80 163 1024 Until 2010
112 233 2048 Until 2030
128 283 3072 Beyond 2030
192 409 7680
256 571 15360
the complete SSL protocol [4, 5, 6, 7] or simply some of the underlying operations [8, 9].
In recent years, the use of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for public-key cryptography
has been increasingly popular among researchers and industry members. ECC was inde-
pendently proposed by Miller [10] and Koblitz [11] in the 1980s. The advantage of ECC
over the more commonly used Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [12] algorithm for public-key
cryptography is that ECC allows for reduced key sizes while providing a similar level of secu-
rity. Table 1.1 [13] shows the comparison of the key sizes for symmetric-key and public-key
cryptosystems and their respective protection lifetimes. The security levels shown assume
that the adversary has computational powers limited to the state-of-the-art at the time (i.e.
computational security), as opposed to informational theoretic security where the algorithms
can be proven to be secure. The shorter key sizes allow implementations of ECC to be more
efficient either in terms of higher throughput or lower area. Higher throughput implementa-
tions can be found in applications where high speeds are required, such as network servers,
at the expense of area and power consumptions [14, 15]. In more restricted environments,
such as Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), cell phones and Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) readers [16, 17], the design goal becomes to reduce the area and power consumptions
at the expense of lower throughput. Due to these advantages, ECC has been adopted by
many standards, such as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [18], Stan-
dards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG) [19], and Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) 186-3 [20].
In particular, NIST [18] and SECG [19] recommend the use of different specific named
curves to be used for various purposes. For example, the United States National Security
2
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Finite Field Arithmetic
Figure 1.1: Levels of abstraction in ECC implementations
Agency (NSA) chose to use prime field elliptic curves of key size 256, 384 and 521 published by
NIST [18] for both classified and unclassified information [21]. These recommended curves can
be divided into two categories: prime Galois fields (or prime fields), GF (p), and binary Galois
fields (or binary fields), GF (2m). Furthermore, the binary field curves can be further divided
into pseudo-random and Koblitz curves. In order to maximize the usability of a server, it
should be able to support all the named curves recommended by the standards. Thus, this
thesis investigates scalable and unified ECC processor architectures that can support all the
curves recommended by NIST [18].
Offloading complex public-key cryptography operations to hardware can take place in any
level of abstraction shown in Figure 1.1. In other words, hardware accelerator implementa-
tions can range from offloading only the finite field arithmetic operations to hardware and
implementing all the overlaying levels in software to implementing a complete protocol, such
as Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH), including all its underlying levels in hardware, such that the interface merely needs
to input the message to be signed, in case of ECDSA, and the module outputs the resultant
signed message.
In this thesis, scalability is defined as the ability for the design to be able to support a
range of key sizes without the need to redesign or reprogram the hardware, and a unified
design is one that is able to compute both GF (p) and GF (2m) operations using the same
hardware. Designing a scalable and unified ECC processor improves the efficiency of the
hardware utilization, since the same hardware is able to handle both primes and binary fields
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and a range of key sizes without the need for any human intervention.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 looks at the current
literature on scalable and unified ECC processors; Section 1.2 further discusses the motivation
of this thesis; Section 1.3 describes the research problem and the major contributions of this
thesis; and Section 1.4 outlines the organization of the remainder of this thesis.
1.1 Literature Review of ECC Processors
Savas et al. [22] proposed a scalable and unified multiplier in 2000, which uses the Montgomery
multiplication algorithm and it can handle operands of any size, but requires precomputations
and transformations. The design has been implemented on application-specific integrated
circuit (ASIC). Furthermore, it only offloads the finite field arithmetic. In [23], two more
dual-field multiplier architectures are presented by Savas et al. that use precomputation
technique and dual-radix design to achieve faster computation times in both fields at the
expense of larger area utilization on ASIC.
In 2004, Chelton and Benaissa [24] propose a scalable arithmetic unit that can operate
over any field in GF (2m), but not prime fields. It proposes architectures for both a scalable
multiplier and a scalable divider that can be used in a ECC processor, but does not design
the complete processor.
In [25], Tanimura et al. propose a hardware implementation of the Montgomery multipli-
cation in ASIC using 4 parallel radix-216 multipliers in GF (p) and a radix-264 multiplier in
GF (2m) in order to balance the time delay difference when computing prime field and binary
field arithmetic in hardware.
In 2009, Chiou et al. [26] propose a scalable unified multiplier architecture for both fields,
but it only supports prime fields of modulo P = 2m − 1 and all-one polynomials (AOP),
which most NIST [18] and SECG [19] recommended curves are not.
In all of the above describe implementations, only the finite field arithmetic is offloaded
into hardware. Hardware implementations of designs that also include higher levels of ab-
straction are described below.
In 2001, Goodman and Chandrakasan [27] describes a microcode-based design that im-
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plements finite field arithmetic in both fields, point addition, point doubling and point mul-
tiplication. The design is implemented using ASIC and provides an energy-efficient solution.
It also uses the Montgomery multiplication algorithm.
In 2003, Satoh and Takano [28] propose a scalable dual-field processor that supports any
prime or binary field, but only shows results up to 256 bits. The design uses Montgomery
multiplication algorithm and is implemented on ASIC. It also supports protocol level opera-
tions, such as DSA and ECDSA.
In 2008, Wang et al. [29] present a coprocessor that operates over both fields that is
capable of performing both RSA and ECC operations. The implemented arithmetic unit
includes multiplication, addition, subtraction and inversion for both prime and binary fields.
However, the design only supports 1 field size at a time. Implementation results are presented
for both field programmable gate array (FPGA) and ASIC platforms.
In 2008, Lai and Huang [30] proposed a dual-field coprocessor that supports arbitrary
prime or binary fields and arbitrary elliptic curves. It optimizes the scheduling of the point
operations to increase performence. However, the buffer size of the processor limits the key
size of the processor. The paper only presents results up to 256-bit key sizes. Lai and Huang
have also presented 2 other designs that improve on the first one in [31, 32].
Chen et al. [33] propose a unified design for both RSA and ECC. The authors implement
a microcode-based architecture, where 3 tiers of instruction sets can be executed depending
on desired level of abstraction in RSA or ECC operations. Furthermore, the proposed design
does not support prime field operations in ECC. The processor is optimized for modular
exponentiation in GF (p) and arithmetic in GF (2m). Therefore, in order to support GF (p)
in ECC, it would require support for addition, subtraction, inversion, in addition to multi-
plication that it currently implements. By doing so, the critical path of the processor would
increase, considerably due to the carry propagation of the addition and subtraction.
In [34], Chen et al. propose a 160-bit and 256-bit unified ECC processor implemented on
ASIC that can support both fields. It uses a radix-4 division unit to increase the speed of
the calculations. However, the processor is not a scalable design.
Lee et al. [35] present a dual-field heterogeneous processing element architecture, where
one processing unit performs multiplication-addition/subtraction and the other evaluates all
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of the above plus division.
There are also architectures in the current literature, which are not unified but are scal-
able. These designs either implement the ECC processor (ECP) in binary or in prime fields.
The binary field ECPs are discussed first. In 2006, Benaissa and Lim [36] proposed a scalable
ECC processor that uses a digit-serial multiplier and squaring unit. Thus, the design is scal-
able and can support multiple fields. In 2009, Hassan and Benaissa [37] proposed a scalable
ECC processor that uses the PicoBlaze soft-core microcontroller in Xilinx FPGAs to imple-
ment the design using the hardware/software co-design (HSC) approach. The motivation is
to design a processor that can handle the elliptic curves up to the 193-bit key size suggested
in SECG [19] without the need to reconfigure the hardware. The design goal is to reduce area
consumption for area constrained platforms, such as RFID, mobile handsets, smart cards,
and wireless sensor networks [37]. Since then, Hassan and Benaissa have also proposed scal-
able designs that support curves up to 571 bits recommended by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) [38, 17, 39] also for area-constrained environments.
The design proposed in [40] is also a HSC scalable ECC processor, where the authors use
the on-chip PowerPC in Virtex-4 FX series to build the system. However, the reconfiguration
of the portion that computes the elliptic curve point multiplication (ECPM) is dynamically
reloaded at run time using partial reconfiguration technology on Virtex FPGAs.
The following ECP designs present scalable ECPs in prime fields. In 2006, McIvor et
al. [41] presented an ECP that can compute the ECPM over prime fields with less than 256
bits based on a new unified modular inversion algorithm. It is one of the fastest prime field
ECPs at the time and it can perform a 256-bit ECPM in 3.86 ms on a Virtex-2 Pro FPGA.
One of the strengths of [41] is that it can evaluate ECPM for any curve. However, it cannot
evaluate all NIST recommended prime field curves because it can only support up to 256-
bits. If the design is extended to 521 bits, hardware utilization will increase immensely and
the maximum clock frequency might also suffer due to more difficult routing in the FPGA.
Thus, in [42], Ananyi et al. proposed a scalable ECP that can support curves up to 521
bits, but only for NIST recommended prime fields, as opposed to any curve up to 521 bits.
The advantage of only supporting NIST recommended curves is the ability to take advantage
of the prime moduli selected by NIST, which can be reduced very easily, requiring fewer
6
hardware resources compared to using Montgomery multiplications and inversions as in [41].
Similar to [41], the authors in [42] chose a very wide datapath, using 265 bits for the
modular adder, subtractor and multiplier and using 521 bits for the modular inverter. As a
result, the implemented design on a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA uses 20,793 slices and 32 DSP48
blocks and only runs at 60 MHz. It can compute ECPM for 192-, 244-, 256-, 384-, and
521-bit curves in 4.8 ms, 5.8 ms, 6.9 ms, 19.9 ms, and 45.6 ms, respectively. In 2011, the
authors in [43] developed MicroECC, which only has 16- or 32-bit datapaths to make the
implementation much smaller and faster.
There are also designs that are neither scalable nor unified. These target a specific curve
and can have very optimized designs. In [14], the authors present a highly efficient ECP
for the 163-bit pseudo-random curve recommended by NIST. The design uses parallel cores
to perform arithmetic. The ECPs in [44] are specifically designed for 163, 233 and 283-bit
Koblitz curves recommended by NIST. The design uses 4 parallel multipliers to improve
the performance of the ECPM operation. In 2008, Gu¨neysu and Paar [45] optimized the
architecture of the ECP using high performance Digial Signal Processing (DSP) slices on
FPGAs. In [46], the authors developed a side channel attack resistant ECP using the double-
and-add-always algorithm. The authors of [47] and [48] use the residue number system (RNS)
to parallelize the operations in the ECP.
A summary of the works reviewed in this section is provided in Table 1.2. The table
describes the technology used and the level of abstraction implemented on hardware. It
indicates whether or not the designs are scalable and the finite field that is supported. Finally,
some brief remarks are provided about each work.
1.2 Motivation
In the works described in Section 1.1, there are no designs that are scalable and unified for all
15 elliptic curves recommended by NIST [18] on the same hardware. Many ECC implemen-
tations in literature are highly optimized designs. Many of the architectures presented are
flexible, where a different field or key length can be implemented by scaling the proposed ar-
chitecture accordingly. However, this results in larger designs when implementing the larger
7
Table 1.2: Summary of ECPs in the Current Literature
Work Tech. Abst. Scalable Field Remarks
[22] ASIC Multiplier Yes Unified • Montgomery multiplication.
[23] ASIC Multiplier Yes Unified • 2 multipliers: precomputation; duual-radix
[24] FPGA AU Yes Binary • HSC: Control in software, arithmetic in hardware
[25] ASIC Multiplier Yes Unified • 4 parallel radix-216. multipliers in prime
• Radix-264 multiplier in binary.
[26] N/A Multiplier Yes Unified • prime number has the form 2m − 1.
• Irreducible polynomial is an all one polynomial.
[27] ASIC ECPM Yes Unified • Microcode-based design.
• Energy efficient.
[28] ASIC Protocol Yes Unified • Arbitrary prime number and irreducible polynomial.
• Uses 64-bit multipliers.
[29] ASIC &
FPGA
ECPM No Unified • Supports RSA and ECC.
• Uses signed-digit number representation.
[30] ASIC &
FPGA
ECPM No Unified • Arbitrary elliptic curve and finite field.
• 4 32-bit multipliers and 4 64-bit adders.
[31] ASIC ECPM No Unified • AHB interface to easily integrate into existing systems.
• Improvement from [30]
[32] ASIC ECPM No Unified • Energy-adaptive design.
• Improves inversion. Improvement from [31]
[33] ASIC ECPM Yes Unified • Microcode-based design.
• Only binary ECC and prime RSA.
[34] ASIC ECPM No Unified • Fast radix-4 unified division
[35] ASIC &
FPGA
ECPM Yes Unified • Power-Analysis Resistant.
• Heterogeneous dual-processing-element
[36] FPGA ECPM Yes Binary • Word-level algorithm for multiplication and squaring.
[37] FPGA ECPM Yes Binary • HSC using PicoBlaze.
• Low area design. SEGC curves.
[38] FPGA ECPM Yes Binary • HSC using PicoBlaze.
• Low area design.
• SEGC curves.
• Word-level modular reduction
[17] FPGA ECPM Yes Binary • HSC using PicoBlaze.
• NIST pseudo-random curves
[39] FPGA ECPM Yes Binary • HSC using PicoBlaze.
• NIST Koblitz curves
[40] FPGA ECPM Yes Binary • Dynamic partial reconfiguration.
• Up to 283 bits.
[41] FPGA ECPM Yes Prime • Up to 256 bits.
• Improved modular inversion.
[42] FPGA ECPM Yes Prime • NIST prime curves up to 521 bits.
• Large inversion module.
[43] FPGA ECPM Yes Prime • HSC approach.
• Fast reduction algorithm.
[14] FPGA ECPM No Binary • 163-bit pseudo-random curves.
• Parallel cores
[44] FPGA ECPM No Binary • 163, 233 and 283-bit Koblitz curves.
• Parallelization of instructions.
[45] FPGA ECPM No Prime • Uses DSP blocks.
• Shows 224 and 256-bit implementations.
[46] ASIC &
FPGA
ECPM No Prime • Parallelization techniques for affine coordinate ECPM.
[47] FPGA ECPM No Prime • RNS to speed up ECPM.
[48] FPGA ECPM No Prime • RNS-based design.
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key sizes, such as 571 bits. Even though these designs have high speeds, it is not practical to
deploy a hardware accelerator that supports different types of curves on the same hardware
using these architectures.
This thesis improves on the state-of-the-art implementations of the ECC processors de-
scribed in Section 1.1 in order to achieve faster computational times, which in turn enhances
the users’ experience by reducing the wait times for a secure connection. In addition, this
thesis will also look to integrate scalable and unified architectures into the design of ECC
processors to enhance their capabilities. In this thesis, the point multiplication level and all
the levels below it in Figure 1.1 are implemented in hardware.
In server-side applications, scalability, high-throughput and low latency are some of the
factors that determine the performance of a cryptosystem processor. As previously men-
tioned, during the handshaking step in the SSL protocol, ECC scalar multiplications occurs
frequently between the client and the server. Every time during the handshaking step, the
client and the server must agree on the key length and thus the elliptic curve to be used for
the ECDSA and ECDH. As a result, the server must have the ability to support a range
of curves, in order to be able to accept requests from different clients requiring different
security levels, and it must be able to respond to requests promptly. Due to the long com-
putation times of the scalar multiplication in the software environment, many servers look
to offload this computationally intensive operation into a separate hardware environment,
called hardware accelerators. Thus, it is important that these servers are complemented by
ECC processors that are scalable and have high throughput and low latency.
In the current literature, some authors also present ECC architectures that can support
any field size. However, this thesis only investigates curves recommended by NIST [18]. The
advantage of selecting only a particular set of curves is that the processor architecture can
be more optimized to yield lower latencies and smaller hardware resource utilization, while
maintaining its practicality since NIST curves are widely used.
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1.3 Description of the Research and Major Contribu-
tions
In this thesis, the ECC processor designs are scalable, where the key length can be changed
on-the-fly during run-time. In other words, the same hardware design has the ability to
support multiple curves. The advantage of these scalable ECC processors is the ability to
share the hardware resources for computing the underlying finite field arithmetic operations
among different key lengths. In server-side applications, where the support of a wide range of
key lengths is important, scalable ECC processors can support various key lengths with the
same hardware, whereas the high-speed and optimized implementations in literature require
different hardware for different key lengths.
Furthermore, due to the resource sharing, the total hardware utilized to implement all
NIST curves in the same hardware is much smaller than implementing a ECC processor for
each curve independently. For example, the architecture presented by Sutter et al. [49] uses
6,150, 8,134, 7,069, 10,236, 11,640 slices for 163, 233, 283, 409, 571-bit ECC, respectively, on
a Virtex-5 FPGA. If the server-side application is to support all 5 key lengths, the resultant
hardware would require 43,229 slices. Furthermore, if the design in [49] were to implement
all 5 processors on the same FPGA, the routing delay would increase dramatically as the
FPGA would start to fill up, causing the clock frequencies to not be as high as reported.
Thus, it is important to investigate the on-the-fly scalability of the ECC processor im-
plementations in order to be able to support a wider range of key lengths on the same
hardware for server-side applications, where both high-speed and scalability, are important
performance factors.
The main objectives of this thesis are:
• Research different architectures of finite field arithmetic to be used for implementing
scalable ECC processors;
• Research different architectures of ECC processors in both prime and binary fields;
• Implement hardware scalable ECC processors in both prime and binary fields;
• Implement a scalable and unified ECC processor for all curves recommended by NIST.
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The foundation of the ECPs is the finite field arithmetic, as shown in Figure 1.1. Thus,
the efficiency of the ECC processor is highly dependent on the architecture of the finite field
arithmetic units. In this thesis, much of the focus is on improving the efficiency of the ECC
processing by modifying the architecture of the finite field arithmetic units.
The major contributions of this thesis are:
• Design of scalable finite field arithmetic blocks for scalable ECPs;
• Efficient parallelization of multiplication and ECPM operations;
• Efficient use of DSP48E slices for the scalable prime field ECP;
• Efficient use of DSP48E slices for the scalable and unified ECP.
In this thesis, the objective of implementing a scalable ECP is accomplished by the design
of scalable finite field arithmetic blocks. These blocks implement digit-wise operations in fi-
nite fields in order to allow for hardware resource sharing among the different bit lengths. The
reduction operations for each finite field is also optimized, when possible, to be implemented
in the same hardware. Subsequently, the parallelization of these finite field arithmetic blocks
is explored. There are 2 levels of parallelization deployed. Firstly, the algorithm used for
multiplication is parallelized to reduce the latency of the operation. Secondly, the operations
required for the ECPM (i.e. point addition and point doubling operations) are parallelized
by separating the multiplication from the addition, subtraction and reduction. By doing so,
the multiplication operation, which requires a high number of clock cycles can be evaluated
in parallel with multiple execution of the other instructions to reduce the overall latency.
The implementation of the ECP for prime fields explores the use of DSP48E slices that
exist in Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs. These DSP48E slices have built-in hardware multipliers
and arithmetic logic units (ALU) that can be used to improve the performance of the ECP.
The DSP48E slices also have the ability to perform logical operations, such as exclusive-OR
(XOR), which is used efficiently in the implementation of the scalable and unified ECP that
requires both prime and binary field additions.
In this thesis, a series of ECC processors have been designed and implemented targeting
FPGA platform. Some of the designs described in this thesis have been published in [50, 51,
52, 53, 54]. As previously mentioned, main objective of the thesis is to implement a scalable
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and unified ECC processor with a high throughput that is suitable for server-side security
applications.
1.4 Organization of Thesis
The subsequent chapters are organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses background informa-
tion about finite field arithmetic, elliptic curve cryptography and provides an overview of the
Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA used in the thesis; Chapter 3 presents the design and architecture of
scalable ECPs for binary fields; Chapter 4 presents the design and architecture of a scalable
ECP for prime fields; Chapter 5 presents the design and architecture of a scalable and uni-
fied ECP for both binary and prime fields; Chapter 6 provides a conclusion to the thesis.
Chapter 7 proposes potential future work for this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter describes some of the background theory and information related to cryp-
tography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Much of the information presented in
this chapter is described in [55]. Following the levels of abstraction shown in Figure 1.1,
Section 2.1 presents an introduction to cryptography and some protocols used in ECC, Sec-
tion 2.2 presents information specific to ECC and Section 2.3 reviews some of the finite
field arithmetic operations that will be used in the designs of this thesis. In Section 2.4, an
overview of Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs is provided and the architecture of the Xilinx XtremeDSP
slices is described.
2.1 Introduction to Cryptography
Consider the simple communication model presented in Figure 2.1, where Alice and Bob
send messages to each other through a channel. In the case of an unsecured channel, an
eavesdropper, Eve, can very easily monitor the communication channel and have access to
all the interaction between Alice and Bob. Consider the case of an online banking system,
where Alice is a bank client logging into her computer and Bob is the bank’s server. If the
information is transferred through the unsecured channel, a malicious party, Eve, can very
Alice Bob
Eve
Channel
Figure 2.1: Simple communication model of an unsecured channel.
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ChannelEncrypt Decrypt
m = 1001
k = 1100 k = 1100
c = m + k
c = 0101
m = c + k
m = 1001
Figure 2.2: Communication model with symmetric-key cryptography.
Alice Bob
p, g
p, g
A
B
A = ga mod p
B = gb mod p
k = Ba mod p k = Ab mod p
Figure 2.3: Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
easily obtain Alice’s online banking information.
One way to secure the information is by using symmetric-key cryptography. Figure 2.2
shows an example of symmetric-key cryptography, where Alice sends the binary message,
m = 1001, to Bob. First, she encrypts the message by performing an exclusive OR (XOR)
operation with the binary secret shared key, k = 1100, to generate the binary cipher, c = 0101.
The encrypted cipher is sent to Bob through the channel and Bob decrypts the message by
once again performing an XOR on the cipher with the secret shared key to retrieve the
original message. By doing so, no one can retrieve the original message unless he/she is in
possession of the key, k. However, in the situation described above, the problem still remains
in how Alice and Bob can share the secret key securely, without anyone else knowing.
Public-key cryptography provides a solution for solving the problem of exchanging keys
securely. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [56] proposed a scheme to share keys between two
parties, called the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, shown in Figure 2.3. To begin the exchange,
Alice selects a large prime number, p, and a large base integer, g. She sends these values
to Bob through an unsecured channel. Alice also selects another large integer, a, evaluates
A = ga mod p and transmits the value of A to Bob. Simultaneously, after Bob receives the
values of p and g, he selects a large integer, b, evaluates B = gb mod p and transmits B to
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Alice. Finally, Alice computes k = Ba mod p and Bob computes k = Ab mod p to obtain
the secret shared key. The final k value is common for both Alice and Bob because k = Ba
mod p = (gb)a mod p = (ga)b mod p = Ab mod p. Thus, k can be used as the shared
secret key to establish a secured communication channel using symmetric-key cryptography
between Alice and Bob.
In the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, only the values p, g, A and B are transmitted on the
unsecured channel, Eve cannot compute the value of k, without knowing a or b. Furthermore,
computing the value of a from A, p, and g is extremely difficult and is usually referred to as
the discrete logarithm problem. In the above described scheme, a and b are referred to as
the private keys, which are never shared to the public, and A and B are referred to as public
keys.
2.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a type of public-key cryptography that is based on a
set of operations on elliptic curves. The description of the background in ECC in this section
is based on the information in [55].
As previously mentioned, ECC operations recommended by NIST can be subdivided
into prime fields, GF (p), or binary fields, GF (2m). It changes the underlying finite field
operations, but it also changes the elliptic curves that the operations are defined over.
The equation of the elliptic curve can be given by the Weierstrass equation. The simplified
version of the Weierstrass equation for binary fields is:
E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (2.1)
where a and b are elements of the binary field, GF (2m). For prime fields, the Weierstrass
equation becomes:
Ep : y
2 = x3 + ax+ b (2.2)
where a and b are elements of the prime field, GF (p). In NIST, these equations are further
simplified by setting one of the coefficients as a constant. Thus, for binary pseudo-random
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Figure 2.4: Example of an elliptic curve (y2 = x3 − 3x+ 2).
curves, the equation is:
E : y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + b (2.3)
where b is a constant depending on the curve. For binary Koblitz curves, the equation is:
Ea : y
2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + 1 (2.4)
where a = 0 or 1. For prime curves, the equation is:
Ep : y
2 = x3 − 3x+ b (2.5)
where b is also a constant depending on the curve. This thesis focuses only on the curves that
are recommended by NIST [18]. Thus, the remainder of this thesis describes only operations
related to the above mentioned NIST curves.
ECC operations can be understood by using geometry on the plot of the curve. Consider
the elliptic curve in Figure 2.4, with equation y2 = x3−3x+2. Two operations can be defined
16
P = (x1, y1)
Q = (x2, y2) -R
R = (x3, y3)
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(a) Example of point addition on an ellip-
tic curve (y2 = x3 − 3x+ 2).
P = (x1, y1)
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R = (x3, y3)
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(b) Example of point doubling on an el-
liptic curve (y2 = x3 − 3x+ 2).
Figure 2.5: Example of point operations on an elliptic curve.
on the curve, namely point addition (PADD) and point doubling (PDBL). The graphical
interpretation of the point addition is shown in Figure 2.5(a). Given two points, P = (x1, y1)
and Q = (x2, y2), where P 6= ±Q, the addition of the two points, R = (x3, y3) = P + Q, is
given by drawing a straight line between P and Q and extending the line until it intersects
the curve on a third point, −R, and then negating the point. The negative of a point, (x, y),
in binary fields is (x, x+ y) and (x,−y) in prime fields.
Figure 2.5(b) shows the point doubling operation. Given a point, P , where P 6= −P ,
the double of the point, R = 2P , is given by drawing a line tangent to the elliptic curve at
point, P , extending the line until it intersects with the curve at a second point, −R, and
then negating the point.
Point addition and point doubling can also be represented mathematically, but the ex-
pressions differ for binary fields and prime fields. In binary fields, point addition is defined
as:
x3 = λ
2 + λ+ x1 + x2 + a and y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1 (2.6)
where λ = y1+y2
x1+x2
, and point doubling is defined as:
x3 = x
2
1 +
b
x21
and y3 = x
2
1 + λx3 + x3 (2.7)
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where λ = x1 +
y1
x1
. In prime fields, point addition is defined as:
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2 and y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1 (2.8)
where λ = y2−y1
x2−x1 and point doubling is defined as:
x3 = λ
2 − 2x1 and y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1 (2.9)
where λ =
3x21+a
2y1
.
Using the point addition and doubling operations, the scalar multiplication, or point
multiplication, (ECPM) operation is given by:
Q = kP = P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
(2.10)
where P is a point on the elliptic curve, and k is a scalar integer value. The resultant point,
Q, will also be on the elliptic curve.
The trivial way of computing the scalar multiplication is the double-and-add operation,
where a sequence of point doubling and point addition operations are evaluated based on the
binary representation of k. Algorithm 2.1, which is modified from Algorithm 3.27 in [55],
shows the left-to-right version of the double-and-add algorithm. Q← 2Q is the point doubling
operation and Q← Q+ P is the point addition operation.
Algorithm 2.1 Left-to-right point multiplication
Input: k = (kt−1, . . . , k1, k0), P – a point on Ea
Output: Q = kP
Q←∞
for i from t− 1 down to 0 do
Q← 2Q
if ki = 1 then
Q← Q+ P
end if
end for
return Q
As shown in Algorithm 2.1, the point doubling operation is performed in every iteration of
the for loop and point addition is performed for every non-zero bit of k. Thus, the efficiency
of the ECPM operation depends highly on the implementation of Equations (2.6),(2.7),(2.8),
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and (2.9). Given that finite field division or inversion are the most complex operations
among finite field arithmetic operations, the implementation of PADD and PDBL operations
in affine coordinates, where a point is represented by (x, y), is not very efficient and results in
hardware implementations that either have long latencies or require a large area. Thus, the
use of projective coordinates are proposed to simplify the PADD and PDBL operations. In
this thesis, the latency of the processor is defined by the time of the completion of an ECPM
operation.
In binary fields, the 2 most commonly used projective coordinates are the Lopez-Dahab
(LD) projective coordinates and the standard projective coordinates. The Lopez-Dahab
projective coordinates represent a point using 3 coordinates, (X, Y, Z). The conversion from
LD coordinates back to affine coordinates is given by (x, y) = (X/Z, Y/Z2). Generally,
when using LD coordinates, PADD uses a mixed coordinate addition, where a point in LD
coordinates, (X1, Y1, Z1) is added to a point in affine coordinates, (X2, Y2), to result in a
point in LD coordinates, (X3, Y3, Z3), and PADD becomes as follows:
Z3 = (Z1(X2Z1 +X1))
2
X3 = (Y2Z
2
1 + Y1)
2 + (X2Z1 +X1)
2(Z1(X2Z1 +X1) + aZ1)
2
+(Y2Z
2
1 + Y1)(Z1(X2Z1 +X1))
Y3 = ((Y2Z
2
1 + Y1)(Z1(X2Z1 +X1)) + Z3)(X3 +X2Z3) + (X2 + Y2)Z
2
3
(2.11)
and the PDBL of a point in LD coordinates, (X1, Y1, Z1), to result in a point in LD coordi-
nates, (X3, Y3, Z3), is given by:
Z3 = X
2
1 · Z21
X3 = X
4
1 + b · Z41
Y3 = bZ
4
1 · Z3 +X3 · (aZ3 + Y 21 + bZ41)
(2.12)
Notice that in Equations (2.11) and (2.12), there are no longer any finite field divisions, at
the expense of more multiplications. As long as the complexity of the division outweighs that
of the several multiplication, performing ECPM in projective coordinates is more efficient
than in affine coordinates.
The standard projective coordinates also represent a point with 3 coordinates, (X, Y, Z),
where the conversion back to affine coordinate is given by (x, y) = (X/Z, Y/Z). Most com-
monly, these coordinates are used in combination with the Lopez-Dahab (LD) algorithm [57]
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given in Algorithm 2.2. The advantage of using the LD algorithm is that only the X and Z
coordinates are needed in the main loop. The x and y affine coordinates are recovered in the
conversion step.
Algorithm 2.2 Lopez-Dahab algorithm
Input: k = (kt−1, . . . , k1, k0) with kt−1 = 1, P (x, y), b – curve specific coefficient
Output: Q(x0, y0) = kP
// Initialization - Affine to Projective Conversion
// and processing kt−1 = 1
(X1, Z1)← (x, 1), (X2, Z2)← (x4 + b, x2)
// Main Loop
for i from t− 2 down to 0 do
if ki = 1 then
(X1, Z1)← Madd(X1, X2, Z1, Z2, x)
(X2, Z2)← Mdouble(X2, Z2, b)
else
(X2, Z2)← Madd(X1, X2, Z1, Z2, x)
(X1, Z1)← Mdouble(X1, Z1, b)
end if
end for
// Mxy - Projective to Affine Conversion
x0 ← X1Z1
y0 ← 1x(x+ X1Z1 )[(x+ X1Z1 )(x+ X2Z2 ) + x2 + y] + y
return Q(x0, y0)
In Algorithm 2.2, Madd is defined as:
(X,Z)← Madd(X1, X2, Z1, Z2, x)
{
X ← X1X2Z1Z2 + x(X1Z2 +X2Z1)2
Z ← (X1Z2 +X2Z1)2
}
(2.13)
and Mdouble is defined as:
(X,Z)← Mdouble(X1, Z1, b)
{
X ← X41 + bZ41
Z ← X21Z21
}
(2.14)
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Once again, Equations (2.13) and (2.14) show that no finite field division is required when
using the LD algorithm at the expense of more multiplications.
When Koblitz curves recommended by NIST [18] are used, the ECPM algorithm can be
further optimized by using the τ -adic non-adjacent form (τNAF), which rewrites k into the
form k =
l−1∑
i=0
uiτ
i, where ui ∈ {0,±1} and ul−1 6= 0, τ = µ+
√−7
2
, µ = (−1)1−a, a = 0 or 1, and
l is the bit length of k in τ -adic form. Using LD coordinates and τNAF representation of k,
Algorithm 2.1 is modified and shown in Algorithm 2.3, which is modified from Algorithm 3.66
in [55]. The major differences between Algorithm 2.1 and Algorithm 2.3 are that the latter
performs Q ← τQ for PDBL, which is simply a finite field squaring on each coordinate,
and the need to add or subtract a point in PADD, which can be done efficiently because
the negative of a point with affine coordinates (x, y) is given by −(x, y) = (x, x + y). The
operation Q ← τQ is called Frobenius endomorphism (PFRB). The conversion of k from
binary to τNAF is out of the scope of this thesis. More information can be found in [58] and
in Section 7.1 where future work is discussed.
In prime fields, one of the most efficient projective coordinates used is the Jacobian
projective coordinates. It also uses 3 coordinates, (X, Y, Z) and the conversion to affine
coordinates is given by (x, y) = (X/Z2, Y/Z3). Using Jacobian coordinates, mixed Jacobian-
affine coordinates PADD becomes:
X3 = (Y2Z
3
1 − Y1)2 − (X2Z21 −X1)2(X1 +X2Z21)
Y3 = (Y2Z
3
1 − Y1)(X1(X2Z21 −X1)2 −X3)− Y1(X2Z21 −X1)3
Z3 = (X2Z
2
1 −X1)Z1
(2.15)
and PDBL becomes:
X3 = (3X
2
1 + aZ
4
1)
2 − 8X1Y 21
Y3 = (3X
2
1 + aZ
4
1)(4X1Y
2
1 −X3)− 8Y 41
Z3 = 2Y1Z1
(2.16)
In this thesis, the ECPM in elliptic curves is performed by using the double-and-add
algorithm and the Equations (2.15) and (2.16), where a = −3 as recommended by NIST [18].
Using the ECPM operation, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme can be modified
to use ECC. The scheme is usually referred to as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
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Algorithm 2.3 τNAF point multiplication on Koblitz Curves
Input: k – a binary integer, P (x, y) – a point on Ea
Output: Q = kP
Compute τNAF(k) =
l−1∑
i=0
uiτ
i
// Perform the first point addition of Q←∞± P
if ul−1 = 1 then
Q(X3, Y3, Z3)← P (x, y)
else
Q(X3, Y3, Z3)← P (x, x+ y)
end if
for i from l − 2 down to 0 do // Main loop
// Perform PFRB (Q← τQ)
Q(X3, Y3, Z3)← Q(X23 , Y 23 , Z23)
// Perform PADD
if ui = 1 then
Q(X3, Y3, Z3)← Q(X3, Y3, Z3) + P (x, y)
end if
if ui = −1 then
Q(X3, Y3, Z3)← Q(X3, Y3, Z3) + P (x, x+ y)
end if
end for
return Q(x3, y3)← Q(X3/Z3, Y3/Z23)
Alice Bob
P
P
A
B
A = aP
B = bP
S = aB S = bA
Figure 2.6: Communication model with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).
and is shown in Figure 2.6. In ECDH, Alice initiates communication with Bob by selecting
a base point, P , and transmits the coordinates of A to Bob. Alice also selects a large
integer, a, and evaluates ECPM for A = aP . Simultaneously, Bob selects a large integer,
b, evaluates B = bP and transmits the coordinates of B to Alice. Finally, Alice and Bob
compute S = aB and S = bA to arrive at the shared secret, S, which is equivalent because
S = aB = a(bP ) = b(aP ) = bA.
In Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, ECDH and
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Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) can be used during the handshaking
step for key exchange. Thus, the ECPM operation is crucial in the efficiency of the operation
in secure communication over the network.
2.3 Finite Field Arithmetic
Galois fields (GF ), or finite fields, are a number set with a finite number of elements. Oper-
ations on one or more elements, result in another element in the field. In this thesis, binary
fields refer to GF (2m) and prime fields refer to GF (p).
Finite field arithmetics are the operations that can be performed on the finite field
elements. Generally, the operations that need to be implemented are finite field addi-
tion/subtraction, finite field squaring, finite field multiplication and finite field division or
finite field inversion.
This section is divided into 2 subsections to discuss finite field arithmetic in binary fields
and in prime fields separately.
2.3.1 Finite Field Arithmetic in Binary Fields
In binary fields, an element can be represented in polynomial basis or normal basis. In
polynomial basis representation, an element in the finite field is represented by a bit string,
(am−1, · · · , a2, a1, a0), which correspond to the polynomial [18]:
am−1tm−1 + · · ·+ a2t2 + a1t1 + a0 (2.17)
The field arithmetic is evaluated as polynomial arithmetic modulo P (t), where P (t) is an
irreducible polynomial of order m, called the field polynomial. In normal basis representation,
the finite field element is represented by a bit string, (a0, a1, a2 · · · , am−1), which is defined
as follows [18], given an element θ:
a0θ + a1θ
2 + a2θ
22 + · · ·+ am−1θ2m−1 (2.18)
The advantage of normal basis representation is the simplicity of the square operation,
which is simply a cyclic right shift. However, the multiplication operation becomes much
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more complex compared to the polynomial basis representation. This thesis focuses mainly
on the polynomial representation of binary finite field elements.
The remainder of this section describes some algorithms to evaluate finite field arithmetic
in binary polynomial representation. Among the finite field operations, addition is the most
trivial because it can be evaluated by simply using an XOR operation between the operands.
Finite field squaring without the reduction step can also be very easily implemented by using
the following property:
A(t)2 = am−1t2m−2 + · · ·+ a1t2 + a0 mod P (t) (2.19)
which is simply interleaving 0 bits and operand bits. The reduction step refers to the
mod P (t) operation in Equation (2.19).
The next most complex finite field operation is multiplication. In general, hardware multi-
plication implementations can be divided into 3 categories: bit-serial, bit-parallel, digit-serial.
Bit-serial implementations consume the least amount of hardware resources, but requires m
clock cycles per multiplication [59], where m is the bit length. An example of a bit-serial
implementation is the shift-and-add algorithm, where the multiplicand bits are shifted every
clock cycle and accumulated if the multiplier bit is non-zero. Bit-parallel implementations re-
quire only 1 clock cycle but generally require more hardware resources and are more difficult
to make them support multiple fields simultaneously [60]. The Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier
is an example of bit-parallel multiplier. Digit-serial implementations are a compromise be-
tween the bit-serial and bit-parallel implementations [61]. Digit-serial implementations allow
for the multiplier to support fields of different bit lengths by simply processing different
number of digits, so it is very suitable for a scalable design.
In this thesis, the Comba and the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithms for multiplication will be
described with some details as these algorithms are used in the following chapters.
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Digit-serial finite field multiplication can be defined as follows:
Z(t) = [A(t)×B(t)] mod P (t)
=
[
s−1∑
i=0
ait
iw ×
s−1∑
j=0
bjt
jw
]
mod P (t)
=
[
s−1∑
i=0
s−1∑
j=0
aibjt
(i+j)w
]
mod P (t)
= C(t) mod P (t)
(2.20)
where s = dm/we and w is the number of bits in a digit.
The Comba algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 2.4 (Modified from Algorithm 2 in [62]), is
a digit-wise multiplication algorithm and it processes the operands digit-per-digit. As shown
in Algorithm 2.4, the Comba algorithm is divided into 2 for loops: the least-significant digits
(LSDs) loops and the most-significant digits (MSDs) loops. In each inner loop, the digits are
multiplied together and accumulated. The main features of the Comba algorithm are that
the result is produced LSD-first, and once each iteration of the outer loop is completed, the
computation of the ith digit is complete and can be outputted.
Algorithm 2.4 Comba Multiplication
Input: A = (As−1, . . . , A1, A0) and
B = (Bs−1, . . . , B1, B0)
Output: Z = A ·B = (Z2s−1, . . . , Z1, Z0)
(U, V )← (0, 0)
for i from 0 to s− 1 do // LSDs outer loop
for j from 0 to s− 1 do // LSDs inner loop
(U, V )← (U, V ) + Aj ·Bi−j
end for
Zi ← V
V ← U , U ← 0
end for
for i from s to 2s− 2 do // MSDs outer loop
for j from i− s+ 1 to s− 1 do // MSDs inner loop
(U, V )← (U, V ) + Aj ·Bi−j
end for
Zi ← V
V ← U , U ← 0
end for
Z2s−1 ← V
return Z = (Z2s−1, . . . , Z1, Z0)
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The Karatsuba-Ofman multiplication algorithm is a bit-parallel algorithm and it uses the
divide-and-conquer method to reduce the operand sizes of the multiplication. The Karatsuba-
Ofman algorithm can be defined as follows [55]:
A(t) ·B(t) = (A1tl + A0) · (B1tl +B0)
= αt2l + [β + α + γ]tl + γ
(2.21)
where
α = A1 ·B1, β = (A1 + A0) · (B1 +B0), γ = A0 ·B0,
A(t) = A1t
l + A0, B(t) = B1t
l + B0, l = dn/2e, n is the degree of A(t) and B(t), and
A1, A0, B1, B0 are binary polynomials in t of degree less than l. As a result, a multiplication
of 2 n-bit operands is reduced to 3 multiplications of dn/2e-bit operands. The Karatsuba-
Ofman algorithm can also be modified to split the operands into 3 operands instead of 2. By
doing so, the algorithm is defined as follows [55]:
A(t) ·B(t) = (A2t2r + A1tr + A0)·
(B2t
2r +B1t
r +B0)
= α2t
4r + [β2 + α2 + α1]t
3r
+[β1 + α2 + α1 + α0]t
2r
+[β0 + α1 + α0]t
r + α0
(2.22)
where
α2 = A2 ·B2, β2 = (A2 + A1) · (B2 +B1),
α1 = A1 ·B1, β1 = (A2 + A0) · (B2 +B0),
α0 = A0 ·B0, β0 = (A1 + A0) · (B1 +B0),
A(t) = A2t
2r+A1t
r+A0, B(t) = B2t
2r+B1t
r+B0, r = dn/3e, n is the degree of A(t) and B(t),
and A2, A1, A0, A2, B1, B0 are binary polynomials in t of degree less than r. By separating
the operands into 3 parts, a multiplication of 2 n-bit operands is reduced to 6 multiplications
of dn/3e-bit operands. These two methods of the Karatsuba-Ofman multiplication can be
applied recursively to reduce the complexity of the multiplication.
The modulo P (t) operation, required by both finite field multiplication and squaring,
is called reduction. P (t) is an irreducible polynomial chosen for each specific curve and it
is shown in [18]. The five irreducible polynomials recommended by NIST [18] are shown
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Table 2.1: NIST Recommended Irreducible Polynomials
m Irreducible Polynomial, P (t)
163 t163 + t7 + t6 + t3 + 1
233 t233 + t74 + 1
283 t283 + t12 + t7 + t5 + 1
409 t409 + t87 + 1
571 t571 + t10 + t5 + t2 + 1
in Table 2.1. The same polynomial is used for both pseudo-random and Koblitz curves.
When performing a m-bit polynomial multiplication or squaring as described above, the
result is 2m − 1 bits wide, which falls outside of the finite range of elements in the finite
field. Thus, the reduction operation is performed to reduce the result back to the finite
range. One of the methods to evaluate the reduction step is shown in Algorithm 2.41 –
2.45 in [55]. Algorithm A.1 to Algorithm A.5 in Appendix A show these algorithms for the
5 irreducible polynomials recommended by NIST [18]. The algorithms in [55] modify the
reduction operation into a series of binary field additions, where the operands are shifted
digits of the product.
Consider the example of 163-bit NIST recommended binary field, where P (t) = t163 +
t7 + t6 + t3 + 1. Given that a(t) and b(t) are polynomials of degree 162, their product yields
a polynomial of up to degree 324 (i.e. c(t) = a(t)× b(t) = c324t324 + c323t323 + · · ·+ c1t1 + c0).
Given that t163 + t7 + t6 + t3 + 1 (mod P (t)) = 0 ⇒ t163 = t7 + t6 + t3 + 1 (mod P (t)), so
the following equalities can be derived:
c324t
324 = c324t
168 + c324t
167 + c324t
164 + c324t
161 (mod P (t))
c323t
323 = c323t
167 + c323t
166 + c323t
163 + c323t
160 (mod P (t))
...
c165t
165 = c165t
9 + c165t
8 + c165t
5 + c165t
2 (mod P (t))
c164t
164 = c164t
8 + c164t
7 + c164t
4 + c164t (mod P (t))
c163t
163 = c163t
7 + c163t
6 + c163t
3 + c163 (mod P (t))
(2.23)
Considering each column in Equation (2.23) as a polynomial, one can see that each column
is a shifted version of c324t
161 +c323t
160 + · · ·+c164t+c163. Figure 2.7 shows the same example
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C 0162
C 163324
C 163322 3
C 163319 6
C 163318 7
⊕ 
⊕ 
⊕ 
⊕ C3
3
6
7
⊕ 
⊕ 
⊕ 
⊕ 
7
6
3
6
7
3
⊕ 
⊕ 
⊕ 
⊕ 
C1
C2
C1
C2
C3
= C[324:323]
= C[324:320]
= C[324:319]
Figure 2.7: Example of a polynomial of degree 324 reduced by P (t) = t163 + t7 + t6 +
t3 + 1
in a diagram. When shifting c324t
161 + c323t
160 + · · · + c164t + c163 by 3, it yields the terms
c323t
163 and c324t
164, which has a degree greater than 162, so it must be reduced again, as
shown by block ‘C1’ in Figure 2.7. Similarly, blocks ‘C2’ and ‘C3’ are further reduced when
c324t
161 + c323t
160 + · · ·+ c164t+ c163 is shifted by 6 and 7, respectively.
Another method of performing the reduction operation is by using a reduction matrix for
each finite field, such that the reduction operation is defined as follows:
D(t) = R× C(t) (2.24)
where C(t) is a binary column matrix of the coefficients of the polynomial to be reduced,
(c2m−2, . . . , c1, c0), R is the m × 2m − 1 reduction matrix and D(t) is the reduced column
matrix, (dm−1, . . . , d1, d0). The multiplication and addition operations in the matrix multipli-
cation are performed in GF (2). The reduction matrices are generated by taking an identity
matrix of size 2m−1, and repeatedly eliminating any non-zero elements on the upper half of
the matrix, using the irreducible polynomial, P (t). The resultant reduction matrix indicates
the coefficients in the polynomial to be reduced, C(t), that needs to be added together in
GF (2), to produce each coefficient of D(t).
As an example, consider the irreducible polynomial, P (t) = t5 + t3 + t2 + t + 1, where
m = 5. To generate the R matrix, begin with an identity matrix of size 2m − 1 = 9 and
28
perform the following steps:

100000000
010000000
001000000
000100000
000010000
000001000
000000100
000000010
000000001

→

100000000
010000000
001000000
000000000
000010000
000101000
000100100
000100010
000100001

→

100000000
010000000
000000000
000000000
001010000
001101000
001100100
001100010
000100001

→

100000000
000000000
000000000
010000000
011010000
011101000
011100100
001100010
000100001

→

100000000
000000000
000000000
000000000
011010000
001101000
001100100
011100010
010100001

↓
R =
011010000
101101000
001100100
011100010
110100001
←

000000000
000000000
000000000
000000000
011010000
101101000
001100100
011100010
110100001

←

000000000
000000000
100000000
000000000
111010000
001101000
101100100
111100010
110100001

←

000000000
000000000
100000000
100000000
111010000
101101000
001100100
011100010
010100001

(2.25)
In each step, a non-zero element above the horizontal line is replaced by the modulo 2
addition of the column below the horizontal line and a shifted version of the column matrix
[ 0 1 1 1 1 ]T . The process is repeated until there are no more non-zero elements above
the horizontal line and the R matrix is the m×2m−1 matrix below the horizontal line. Using
the reduction matrix, the polynomial D(t) can be represented by a linear combination of the
coefficients of C(t). Thus, reduction can be evaluated by a series of binary field additions
(i.e. XOR operations).
Finally, the most complex finite field arithmetic operation discussed in this thesis is the
finite field division. Alternatively, finite field inversion can also be used instead of division.
Inversion is defined as an element b = a−1 mod P (t), where ab˙ = 1 mod P (t). One method
of evaluating finite field inversion is by using the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm [63]. The Itoh-Tsujii
algorithm is based on the property that a−1 = a2
m−2 (mod P (t)) in binary fields. Defining
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Table 2.2: Decomposition of m− 1 for Itoh-Tsujii Algorithm
m Decomposition
163 162, 81, 80, 40, 20, 10, 5, 4, 2, 1
233 232, 116, 58, 29, 15, 14, 7, 6, 3, 2, 1
283 282, 141, 140, 70, 35, 17, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1
409 408, 204, 102, 51, 50, 25, 24, 12, 6, 3, 2, 1
571 570, 285, 284, 142, 71, 70, 35, 34, 17, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1
βk(a) = a
2k−1, the following property can be derived:
βk+j(a) = a
2k+j−1
= (a
2k )2
j
a
= (a
2k
a
)2
j · a2j
a
= (a2
k−1)2
j · a2j−1
= βk(a)
2j · βj(a)
(2.26)
Thus, the inverse of an element a−1 can be computed by a−1 = a2
m−2 = (a2
m−1−1)2 =
(βm−1(a))2 and repeatedly decompose the value m − 1 by using Equation (2.26). Table 2.2
shows the decomposition for each m recommended by NIST [18].
To apply Table 2.2, consider the example of using m = 163. The finite field inversion of
an element, a−1 is given by (β162(a))2, and β162(a) can be evaluated as follows:
β162(a) = (β81(a))
281 · β81(a)
β81(a) = (β80(a))
21 · β1(a)
β80(a) = (β40(a))
240 · β40(a)
β40(a) = (β20(a))
220 · β20(a)
β20(a) = (β10(a))
210 · β10(a)
β10(a) = (β5(a))
25 · β5(a)
β5(a) = (β4(a))
21 · β1(a)
β4(a) = (β2(a))
22 · β2(a)
β2(a) = (β1(a))
21 · β1(a)
β1(a) = a
21−1 = a
(2.27)
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By doing so, finite field inversion can be evaluated by a series of multiplications and
repeated squarings. Furthermore, notice that by decomposing the values as given in Table 2.2,
in order to compute the next βk+j(a) value, only the current βk(a) and β1(a) = a values need
to be stored. All other temporary values can be overwritten. Using the method shown in [64],
the Itoh-Tsujii can be further optimized for the 409 and 571 key sizes.
Another method of evaluating finite field inversion is by using the binary inversion algo-
rithm shown in Algorithm 2.49 in [55] and reproduced in Algorithm 2.5. The binary inversion
algorithm is derived from the inversion based on the extended Euclidean algorithm, which
is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is important to note in Algorithm 2.5 that the only
operations required are additions and right-shift operations (division by t), which can be very
easily accomplished in hardware. Furthermore, upon careful analysis of the algorithm, one
can see that at the completion of the if statement at the end of the while loop, only one
of u and v is divisible by t, but not both. Thus, only one of the two inner while loops is
entered in each iteration of the outer while loop. Since each inner while loop divides u or
v by t, it reduces them by 1 bit during each iteration. Thus, the outer while loop executes
a maximum of 2m times, where m is the bit length of a.
Algorithm 2.5 Binary inversion algorithm in binary fields
Input: Irreducible polynomial, f , and binary field element, a = am−1tm−1 + · · ·+ a1t1 + a0
Output: a−1 mod f
u← a, v ← p, g1 ← 1, g2 ← 0
while u 6= 1 and v 6= 1 do
while t divides u do
u← u/t
if t divides g1 then x1 ← g1/t else g1 ← (g1 + f)/t end if
end while
while t divides v do
v ← v/t
if t divides x2 then g2 ← g2/t else g2 ← (g2 + f)/t end if
end while
if deg(u) ≥ deg(v) then u← u+ v, g1 ← g1 + g2 else v ← v + u, g2 ← g2 + g1 end if
end while
if u = 1 then return (g1) else return (g2) end if
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2.3.2 Finite Field Arithmetic in Prime Fields
Prime field arithmetics are operations performed on a closed set of integers. The operation
that keeps all values within range is the modulo operation. Thus, prime field operations are
exactly the same as integer operations, followed by a modulo p, where p is a prime number.
Therefore, values in prime fields can be represented as binary integers of length m.
Addition and subtraction in prime fields are performed as integer addition or subtraction.
Thus, the difference between prime field and binary field additions is that in prime fields there
needs to be a carry chain to propagate the carry, whereas in binary fields, a simple bit-wise
XOR operation would suffice. Multiplication can use similar algorithms as in binary fields
by using Comba algorithm or Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm.
Since all operations are followed by a modulo p operation, the algorithm to perform the
modulo operation has an impact on the performance of all prime field operations. Fortu-
nately, the 5 prime numbers recommended by NIST have been carefully selected to make the
reduction step more efficient. The following are the 5 NIST primes:
p192 = 2
192 − 264 − 1
p224 = 2
224 − 296 − 1
p256 = 2
256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1
p384 = 2
384 − 2128 − 296 + 232 − 1
p521 = 2
521 − 1
(2.28)
In order to see the efficiency of taking the modulo of the above prime numbers, consider
the example shown in [55]. For p192 = 2
192 − 264 − 1, the following equations can be written:
2192 = 264 + 1 (mod p192)
2256 = 2128 + 264 (mod p192)
2320 = 2256 + 2128 = 2128 + 264 + 1 (mod p192)
(2.29)
Consider an integer c, where 0 ≤ c < p2192. It can be written in base-264 as:
c = c52
320 + c42
256 + c32
192 + c22
128 + c12
64 + c0 (2.30)
where ci is a 64-bit integer, so using Equation (2.29) to reduce Equation (2.30), results in
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the following:
c = c52
128 + c52
64 + c5
+ c42
128 + c42
64
+ c32
64 + c3
+ c22
128 + c12
64 + c0 (mod p192)
(2.31)
Thus, the reduction of c becomes a sum of 4 192-bit integers. Using a similar method, the
reduction algorithm for the other NIST primes can also be derived. The reduction algorithms
for all 5 NIST primes can be found in Appendix B.
Similar to binary finite fields, inversion or division is also the most complex operation in
prime fields. In prime fields, the inverse of an element a is defined as, b = a−1 mod p, if
a · b = 1 mod p. One method of evaluating the inverse of an element is the binary inversion
algorithm shown in Algorithm 2.22 in [55] and shown in Algorithm 2.6.
Algorithm 2.6 Binary inversion algorithm in prime fields
Input: Prime number, p, and prime field element, a
Output: a−1 mod p
u← a, v ← p, x1 ← 1, x2 ← 0
while u 6= 1 and v 6= 1 do
while u is even do
u← u/2
if x1 is even then x1 ← x1/2 else x1 ← (x1 + p)/2 end if
end while
while v is even do
v ← v/2
if x2 is even then x2 ← x2/2 else x2 ← (x2 + p)/2 end if
end while
if u ≥ v then u← u− v, x1 ← x1 − x2 else v ← v − u, x2 ← x2 − x1 end if
end while
if u = 1 then return (x1 mod p) else return (x2 mod p) end if
As in the binary fields case, the binary inversion algorithm evaluates inversion with only
a series of addition, subtraction and division by 2, which is simply a right-shift operation.
Using the same analysis as in the binary fields case, one can see that the algorithm also
requires 2m iterations, where m is the bit length of p.
Another method of evaluating inversion in prime fields is by using Fermat’s Little Theo-
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Figure 2.8: Simplified block diagram of the DSP48E slice.
rem. The theorem shows that ap (mod p) = a (mod p), so the following can be derived:
ap (mod p) = a (mod p)
ap−1 (mod p) = 1 (mod p)
a× ap−2 (mod p) = 1 (mod p)
(2.32)
Since a×a−1 (mod p) = 1 (mod p), then it follows that a−1 (mod p) = ap−2 (mod p). Using
this property, the inverse of an element in prime field can be evaluated using exponentiation
by p− 2, which can be evaluated by a series of multiplications and squaring operations.
2.4 Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA and XtremeDSP Slices
In this thesis, the target platform selected for implementing the ECC processors is the Xilinx
Virtex-5 family FPGA [65]. The Virtex-5 FPGA family features 6-input look-up tables
(LUT), which are improved over the 4-input LUTs formerly used by older FPGAs. It also
contains 36-Kbit block RAM (BRAM) and XtremeDSP slices, among other features. In this
section, the XtremeDSP slices are discussed in particular, as they are used by the ECPs
described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The information in this section can be found in [66].
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The XtremeDSP, or DSP48E, slice is a hardware arithmetic block resource that is available
in Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs. The components of the DSP48E slice are fixed, but the slice can
be configured to perform different operations. A simplified block diagram of the DSP48E
slice is shown in Figure 2.8. The main components of the DSP48E slice are the 25 × 18-
bit multiplier and a 48-bit arithmetic logic unit (ALU). The multiplier can be bypassed, in
which case the inputs ‘A’ and ‘B’ are concatenated (‘A:B’ in Figure 2.8) to form one of the
48-bit operands of the ALU and port ‘C’ provides the other 48-bit operand. The ‘PCIN’
and ‘PCOUT’ ports are used to cascade DSP48E slices and can only be connected to the
‘PCOUT’ and ‘PCIN’ ports of an adjacent DSP48E slice.
The registers at the input ports ‘A’ and ‘B’ can be selected to have 0, 1 or 2 registers to
facilitate pipeline balancing when using multiple cascaded DSP48E slices. The ‘A’ and ‘B’
ports may also use pipelining registers when cascading the DSP48E slices. The attributes
AREG, BREG, ACASCREG, and BCASCREG select the number of register. Input port ‘C’
can be selected to have 0 or 1 registers using the CREG attribute. Since these are attribute
settings, they can only be configured pre-synthesis and cannot be modified at runtime.
The ALU can be configured to perform addition, subtraction or other logic operations.
The ALU may use 3 inputs that are selected by multiplexers. These are called X, Y and Z
multiplexers in [66]. The OPMODE input to the DSP48E slice is 7 bits wide and can be
changed at runtime to select different inputs for the ALU. As shown in Table 2.3, Table 2.4
and Table 2.5, OPMODE[1:0] controls the X multiplexer, OPMODE[3:2] controls the Y
multiplexer and OPMODE[6:4] controls the Z multiplexer. In the tables, the selection of P
feeds the output register back into the ALU without going outside of the DSP48E slice. In
addition, in the Z multiplexer, the P or PCIN values can be right-shifted by 17 bits before
inputting into the ALU. This is a built-in feature that does not require additional hardware
resources and is used in the ECP design in Chapter 4.
In addition to the inputs, the operation of the ALU may also be selected during runtime
through the 4-bit ALUMODE input. There are 2 types of operations that the ALU can
perform: 3-operand addition/subtraction or 2-input logical operations. The operations for
each input are shown in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7. When used for 3-input operations, the ALU
uses the output of the X, Y and Z multiplexers as its inputs and performs different combi-
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Table 2.3: OPMODE control signals for X Multiplexer
X
OPMODE[1:0]
X
Multiplexer
Output
Notes
00 0 Default
01 M OPMODE[3:2] must be 01
10 P internal feedback from output register P
11 A:B 48-bit concatenation of ports ‘A’ and ‘B’
Table 2.4: OPMODE control signals for Y Multiplexer
Y
OPMODE[3:2]
Y
Multiplexer
Output
Notes
00 0 Default
01 M OPMODE[1:0] must be 01
10 48’ffffffffffff used for bitwise operation
11 C
Table 2.5: OPMODE control signals for Z Multiplexer
Z
OPMODE[6:4]
Z
Multiplexer
Output
Notes
000 0 Default
001 PCIN
010 P
011 C
100 P use for MACC extend only
101 17-bit shift PCIN
110 17-bit shift P
111 xx Invalid
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Table 2.6: Three-input ALU operations
ALUMODE[3:0] Operation
0000 Z + X + Y + CARRYIN
0011 Z - (X + Y + CARRYIN)
0001
-Z + (X + Y + CARRYIN) - 1 =
not(Z) + X + Y + CARRYIN
0010
not(Z + X + Y + CARRYIN) =
-Z - X - Y - CARRYIN - 1
Table 2.7: Two-input ALU operations
OPMODE[3:2] ALUMODE[3:0] Operation
00 0100 X XOR Z
00 0101 X XNOR Z
00 0110 X XNOR Z
00 0111 X XOR Z
00 1100 X AND Z
00 1101 X AND (NOT Z)
00 1110 X NAND Z
00 1111 (NOT X) OR Z
10 0100 X XNOR Z
10 0101 X XOR Z
10 0110 X XOR Z
10 0111 X XNOR Z
10 1100 X OR Z
10 1101 X OR (NOT Z)
10 1110 X NOR Z
10 1111 (NOT X) AND Z
nations of integer additions and subtractions. When performing 2-input logical operations,
only the X and Z multiplexer outputs are used and the Y multiplexer is set to either output
0 (OPMODE[3:2] = 00) or 48’ffffffffffff (OPMODE[3:2] = 10). The value of OPMODE[3:2]
modifies the logical operation performed as shown in Table 2.7.
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There is also a pattern detection feature built into the DSP48E block that is not shown
in Figure 2.8. It compares the output ‘P’ to a pattern and outputs whether or not they
match. The DSP48E slices can operate at up to 550 MHz by using all the pipeline stages,
which is more efficient than implementing hardware multipliers using other FPGA logic (i.e.
configurable logic blocks (CLB)). In addition, the ability of the ALU to switch between
computing 48-bit addition and 48-bit XOR operation makes the DSP48E slice an optimal
choice for implementing a unified ECP, since it is able to switch between prime and binary
field operations on-the-fly.
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Chapter 3
Scalable ECC Processors for Binary Curves
3.1 163-bit ECC Processor1
In this section, an ECC processor (ECP) that is specific to the 163-bit pseudo-random curve
recommended by NIST [18] is discussed. This work is published in [50] and will be referred
to as ‘163-bit ECP’ in the remainder of this thesis. The architecture of the processor is based
on the design presented by Zhang et al. [14]. The design goal of the ECP in [14] is to reduce
the computation latency of ECPM by using 3 finite field arithmetic logic units (ALUs) in
parallel. Furthermore, the design is optimized for GF (2163), so it is not a scalable design.
Nevertheless, this processor demonstrates some of the characteristics of an ECP.
Figure 3.1 shows the block diagram of the ECC processor presented by [14]. Figure 3.1
shows 3 finite field ALU cores that operate in parallel and the main controller that controls the
operations of each core. Each ALU core, shown in Figure 3.2 [14], is made up of a finite field
multiplier, an adder, a squarer (A2) and a double squarer (A4). The 163-bit multiplication
is performed by taking 4 41× 163-bit multiplications, shifting and adding, and reducing the
result. The squarer is a hard-wired 163-bit finite field squarer, where the interleaving of bits
in Equation (2.19) and the finite field reduction are combined into a single combinational
logic block. Similarly, the double squarer is also a combinational logic block that interleaves
more zero bits and integrates reduction. Overall, each core can simultaneously compute the
results of A · B, (A + B) or (A + B)2, and A4. By doing so, the processor is able to take
advantage of instruction level parallelism without sacrificing the clock frequency because the
critical path of the processor lies on the multiplier.
1The work in this section is published in ISED 2012 [50].
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Figure 3.1: ECC processor from Zhang et al. [14]
Figure 3.2: ALU of the ECC processor from Zhang et al. [14]
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Table 3.1: Implementation Results and Comparison of the 163-bit ECP
Work FPGA Slices
Max.
Freq.
(MHz)
Latency
(µs)
163-Bit
ECP
Virtex-4
XC4VLX80
23,547 163 6.72
Zhang et al.
[14]
Virtex-4
XC4VLX80
20,807 185 7.7
In the 163-bit ECP, the design of the multiplier has been improved. Instead of using
two 41 × 163-bit multipliers as in [14], 2 levels of Karatsuba-Ofman multiplication are im-
plemented. Figure 3.3 shows the architecture of the two-stage Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier,
where 9 41× 41-bit multipliers are used. By doing so, the number of clock cycles to compute
each multiplication reduces from 3 to 2, which reduces the latency of the ECPM calculation.
In addition, the 163-bit ECP also proposes a minor modification to use the 3 cores more
efficiently when computing the finite field inversion for all 3 projective coordinates. As a
result, the ECPM calculation reduces from 1428 clock cycles in [14] to 1088 clock cycles.
The design is implemented for a Virtex-4 FPGA and the results are shown in Table 3.1.
Compared to the implementation results in [14], the number of slices utilized increases from
20,807 to 23,547 but the latency decreases from 7.7 µs to 6.72 µs. In the proposed imple-
mentation, the design goal is to increase the speed of the ECPM calculation for server-side
applications. Thus, the increase in hardware resource utilization is an acceptable trade-off
to decrease the latency.
In the above mentioned processor, one can notice that performance of the ECP depends
highly on the implementation of the finite field arithmetic unit. By using the Itoh-Tsujii
inversion algorithm, the most complex operation in the arithmetic unit is the multiplication,
so the implementation of the finite field multiplier is crucial to the performance of the ECC
processor. Thus, the implementation of scalable ECPs described in the subsequent sections
focuses on managing the critical path of the multiplier while integrating the support for
multiple curves into a single module.
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Figure 3.3: Architecture of 2-stage Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier
3.2 Scalable ECC Processor for Binary Curves
This section discusses architectures of scalable ECP implementation for curves over binary
fields recommended by NIST [18]. The architectures discussed in this section can be found
in [51, 52]. The work in [51] supports all 5 Koblitz curves, and is referred to as ‘Koblitz ECP’
in this thesis. The work in [52] supports all 5 pseudo-random curves recommended by NIST,
and is referred to as ‘Random ECP’ in this thesis.
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3.2.1 Scalable ECP over Koblitz Curves2
Recall from Algorithm 2.3 that using τNAF point multiplication, the point doubling (PDBL)
operation is simplified to squaring of each coordinate using the Frobenius endomorphism
(PFRB) operation. Thus, the point addition (PADD) operations requires more attention.
In the Koblitz ECP, the finite field arithmetic unit (FFAU) is designed to either compute
multiplication or squaring along with an addition at the input and at the output. Figure 3.4
shows the block diagram of the FFAU and the MULT/SQ unit. As shown in Figure 3.4(a),
the FFAU computes two formats of operations, namely Z = (C +A) ·B +D (MULT mode)
and Z = B2 +D (SQ mode). In order to utilize the proposed FFAU architecture, the PADD
operations in Equation (2.11) are rearranged as follows:
T1 ← (0 +X2) · Z3 +X3
X3 ← (0 + Z3) · T1 + 0
T3 ← Z23 + 0
Y3 ← (0 + Y2) · T3 + Y3
Z3 ← X23 + 0
T2 ← (0 + Y3) ·X3 + 0
T1 ← T 21 + 0
X3 ← (aT3 +X3) · T1 + T2
X3 ← Y 23 +X3
T1 ← (0 +X2) · Z3 +X3
Y3 ← Z23 + 0
Y3 ← (X2 + Y2) · Y3 + 0
Y3 ← (T2 + Z3) · T1 + Y3
(3.1)
Figure 3.4(b) shows a more detailed architecture of the MULT/SQ unit. The unit inputs
the operands digit-wise, where the digit is selected to be 32-bits. The input values are stored
in the 18× 32-bit RAMs. For multiplication, the values in the RAMs are read out according
to the indexes in the inner loops of the Comba algorithm in Algorithm 2.4 and passed to
the multiplier block (‘×’). For squaring, the values in RAM A are read out sequentially and
2The work in this section is published in Microprocessors and Microsystems [51].
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Figure 3.5: Block diagram of the Koblitz ECP.
passed to the ‘SQ’ block. The 32-bit multiplier (‘×’) is a combinational Karatsuba-Ofman
multiplier and the ‘SQ’ block interleaves zero bits with operand bits to evaluate Equation
(2.19). The UV register accumulates the result of (U, V ) ← (U, V ) + Aj · Bi−j given in
Algorithm 2.4. The right side of Figure 3.4(b) performs the reduction operation as shown in
Algorithm A.1 – Algorithm A.5 with the exception of the final reduction step. In the Koblitz
ECP, the output of the FFMULT and FFSQ is never completely reduced to improve efficiency.
Since FFMULT and FFSQ are performed digit-wise, the reduction is only completed to the
border of the digit. For example, in 233-bit mode, s = d233/32e = 8, so the reduction
operation, reduces the digits (Z15, . . . , Z9, Z8), but does not reduce the 23 most-significant
bits (MSB) in Z7, making all the intermediate results 8× 32 = 256 bits instead of 233 bits.
The final reduction step, which reduces the 23 MSBs of Z7 occurs after all the calculations
are performed and just before the result is output.
Figure 3.5 shows the top level block diagram of the Koblitz ECP. The affine coordinates
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of the point, (x1, y1), enter the module as 32-bit digits, along with the τNAF converted value
of k, with the magnitude entering in k and the sign bits in ks. The controller contains the
finite state machine (FSM) that dictates the control flow of the processor. The temporary
values are stored in the RAM and the ‘Final Shift Unit’ performs the final reduction step in
Algorithm A.1 – Algorithm A.5. Finally, the resultant affine coordinates are output through
x3 and y3.
During the projective to affine coordinate conversion, a finite field inversion is required.
The ECP is able to implement inversion using the same FFAU described above by using the
Itoh-Tsujii algorithm described in Section 2.3.1. As previously mentioned, the Itoh-Tsujii
algorithm converts inversion into a series of multiplication and squaring operations. Thus,
the FFAU is able to support inversion without any modifications and a separate inversion
unit is not required.
In order for the architecture to be scalable, the RAM must be able to support d571/32e =
18 digits. Furthermore, since the FFAU inputs operands digit-by-digit, the architecture sup-
ports multiple field sizes without the need to reconfigure the hardware making the proposed
ECP scalable.
The main contribution of the architecture of the Koblitz ECP is the compactness of the
design, while providing the ability of evaluating the ECPM of all 5 NIST recommended
Koblitz curves without the need to reconfigure the hardware. Furthermore, the finite field
addition operations are integrated with the multiplication and squaring without affecting the
critical path, which lies inside the MULT/SQ unit.
Table 3.2 shows the implementation results of the above mentioned Koblitz ECP on
FPGA platforms. The register, look-up table (LUT), slice, BRAM and maximum frequency
values are obtained post-place and route from the Xilinx ISE Software. The latency value
is the time to compute the ECPM operation obtained by multiplying the number of clock
cycles needed to evaluate the ECPM by the minimum clock period of the design (minimum
period = 1 / maximum frequency):
Latency = (Number of clock cycles per ECPM)× (Minimum clock period)
=
Number of clock cycles per ECPM
Maximum clock frequency
(3.2)
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Table 3.2: Implementation Results and Comparison of the Koblitz ECP
Work FPGA Registers LUT Slices BRAM
Max.
Freq.
(MHz)
m
Latency
(ms)
Efficiency(
ECPM
s·slice
)
Koblitz
ECP
Spartan-3
XC3S400
1,232 3,850 2,220 8 93.08
163 0.456 0.988
233 1.008 0.447
283 1.227 0.367
409 3.215 0.140
571 7.236 0.062
Hassan and
Benaissa
[39]
Spartan-3
XC3S200
913 2,028 1,278 4 90
163 15.5 0.050
283 45.1 0.017
571 121.4 0.006
To more easily compare the performance between different hardware implementation, the
efficiency metric is used throughout this thesis and is defined as:
Efficiency =
Number of ECPM per second
Number of slices
=
1
(Latency)× (Number of slices)
(3.3)
The efficiency metric is computed as throughput divided by the number of slices, such that
a higher efficiency represents better performance. The Koblitz ECP is implemented on a
Spartan-3 FPGA to compare its performance with the work in [39], where the authors propose
a scalable ECP for Koblitz curves, but only supports 163, 283 and 571 bit lengths. The
Koblitz ECP has a 73.7% increase in number of slices used, but decreases the latency by a
factor of 16.7 to 34 times. As a result, the efficiency metric shows that the Koblitz ECP
outperforms the work in [39]. It is important to note that the same hardware is used to
evaluate the ECPM for the 5 Koblitz curves and the selection of the curve can be performed
on-the-fly with a change of the input value to the ECP. As previously mentioned, this feature
is referred to as scalability in this thesis.
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Figure 3.6: Block diagram of the FFAU of the Random ECP.
3.2.2 Scalable ECP over Pseudo-Random Curves3
The architecture of the Random ECP is very similar to the one of the Koblitz ECP, except
the processor is designed for pseudo-random curves recommended by NIST instead of Koblitz
curves. Since the pseudo-random curves use the same field sizes and irreducible polynomials
as the Koblitz curve equivalent, the Random ECP uses similar finite field arithmetic blocks
as the Koblitz ECP. The block diagram of the FFAU used in the Random ECP is shown in
Figure 3.6.
The main difference in the FFAU is that in the Random ECP, it has the ability to perform
Z = (C+A)2+D instead of Z = B2+D in SQ mode. The extra addition allows for the ECPM
operations to be more optimized. In the Random ECP, the Lopez-Dahab (LD) algorithm as
3The work in this section is published in ISCAS 2013 [52].
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shown in Algorithm 2.2 is used in the evaluation of the ECPM. In order for the operations
to work with the proposed finite field arithmetic blocks, the operations in the main loop in
Algorithm 2.2 are modified to the following:
T1 ← (0 +X1) ∗ Z2 + 0
T2 ← (0 +X2) ∗ Z1 + 0
Z2|Z1 ← (T1 + T2)2 + 0
T3 ← (0 + x) ∗ Z2|Z1 + 0
X2|X1 ← (0 + T1) ∗ T2 + T3
T1 ← (0 +X1|X2)2 + 0
T2 ← (0 + T1)2 + 0
T3 ← (0 + Z1|Z2)2 + 0
R ← (0 + T3)2 + 0
X1|X2 ← (0 +R) ∗ b+ T2
Z1|Z2 ← (0 + T1) ∗ T3 + 0
(3.4)
Furthermore, the operations in the projective to affine coordinate conversion, Mxy in
Algorithm 2.2, also need to be modified to the following to take advantage of the finite field
arithmetic blocks:
T1 ← (0 + x) ∗ Z1 +X1
T2 ← (0 + x) ∗ Z2 +X2
T2 ← (0 + T1) ∗ T2 + 0
T3 ← (0 + x)2 + y
T3 ← (0 + T3) ∗ Z2 + 0
T3 ← (0 + T3) ∗ Z1 + T2
T3 ← (0 + T1) ∗ T3 + 0
T2 ← (0 + Z1)2 + 0
T2 ← (0 + x) ∗ T2 + 0
T2 ← (0 + Z2) ∗ T2 + 0
T1 ← (0 + T2) ∗ y + T3
(3.5)
The above sequence of operations are followed by a finite field inversion on T2, which stores
xZ21Z2 and a multiplication with T1, which stores the numerator portion of y0. Subsequently,
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Table 3.3: Implementation Results and Comparison of the Random ECP
Work FPGA Registers LUT Slices BRAM
Max.
Freq.
(MHz)
m
Latency
(ms)
Efficiency(
ECPM
s·slice
)
Random
ECP
Spartan-3
XC3S400
1,337 4,261 2,418 8 79.64
163 0.864 0.479
233 1.957 0.211
283 2.514 0.164
409 6.911 0.060
571 16.48 0.025
Random
ECP
Virtex-4
XC4VFX12
1,241 4,231 2,648 8 142.53
163 0.483 0.782
233 1.093 0.346
283 1.404 0.269
409 3.861 0.098
571 9.208 0.041
Hassan and
Benaissa
[17]
Spartan-3
XC3S200
650 2,205 1,127 4 68.26
163 38 0.023
233 73.4 0.012
283 104 0.008
409 251 0.004
571 287.4 0.003
the inversion of Z1 is evaluated and its result is multiplied by X1 to produce x0.
Table 3.3 shows the Spartan-3 and Virtex-4 implementation results of the Random ECP.
The values in the table are obtained in a similar fashion as the values in Table 3.2. However,
the implementation results in Table 3.3 cannot be used to compare to the values in Table 3.2
because they evaluate the ECPM for a different set of curves and use different algorithms.
Nevertheless, one observation can be made in comparison to the ECP described in Section 3.1.
The Virtex-4 implementation of the 163-bit ECP requires 23,547 slices and the latency of
the ECPM is 6.72 µs. These results yield an efficiency value of 6.320, which is higher than
0.782 shown in Table 3.3. However, one must remember that the Random ECP is a scalable
ECP, which supports all 5 NIST recommended pseudo-random curves without the need
to reconfigure the hardware. If the architecture of the 163-bit ECP was to be expanded
to support larger key sizes, the hardware resource utilization of the ECP would increase
dramatically. The trade-off of efficiency for scalability is expected and is also observed in
other architectures described in this thesis. Since the goal of the ECPs in this thesis is
to allow for server-side applications to support a wide variety of security requirements, the
performance degradation is tolerable.
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A comparable design is shown in [17] and its implementation result is also shown in
Table 3.3. The design in [17] is very similar to the design in [39], except it handles pseudo-
random curves instead of Koblitz curves. The Spartan-3 implementation result of the Ran-
dom ECP shows that it outperforms the design in [17]. The improved performance is mainly
due to the reduced number of clock cycles of the ECPM operation as a result of the use of
the FFAU.
3.3 Parallelization of Scalable ECC Processor for Bi-
nary Curves4
One of the disadvantages of the architecture of the Koblitz ECP and Random ECP described
in Section 3.2 is the long latency of each multiplication and squaring operation. Furthermore,
since only 1 FFAU is used, the aforementioned ECPs do not take advantage of the potential
for parallelism of the ECPM operations. The ECPs implementation described in this section
improves on the architecture of the Koblitz ECP and Random ECP by resolving some of the
shortcomings. The work presented in this section has been submitted to a journal for peer
review in [67].
3.3.1 Parallelization of Scalable ECP over Koblitz Curves
Figure 3.7 shows the revised finite field arithmetic blocks to improve the performance of
the previous ECPs. Notice that in the revised design, multiplication and squaring are now
separated into 2 blocks and can operate simultaneously. The architecture of the MULT
block, as shown in Figure 3.7(a), is very similar to the multiplication operation in the FFAU
in Figure 3.4(b), except that 2 32-bit multiplier blocks are used, squaring has been removed,
and reduction is not performed in the MULT block. Alternatively, reduction is performed in
the SA block shown in Figure 3.7(b). The SA block can also perform addition and repeated
squaring operations. Each reduction module in the SA block (i.e. ‘R163’, ‘R233’, ‘R283’,
‘R409’, ‘R571’) is based on the reduction matrix according to Equation (2.24). The operands
4The work in this section has been submitted to IEEE Transactions on Computers for peer review [67].
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in both the MULT and SA blocks are 32-bit digits.
To demonstrate the operation of the dual ‘×’ block in the MULT block, consider the case
of the 163-bit operating mode. The addresses read from the RAMs are shown in Figure 3.8.
The contents in RAMs A and B are (A5, A4, · · · , A0) and (B5, B4, · · · , B0), where Ai and
Bi are 32-bit digits. The numbers shown represent the index, i, of the 32-bit value to
be read from the RAM. Each column shows the index read from each RAM port during
a specific clock cycle. The vertical bar represents the completion of an inner loop in the
Comba algorihtm (Algorithm 2.4). Thus, as shown in Figure 3.8, during the first clock cycle,
A0 and B0 are read and multiplied in multiplier 1 (‘×’ block on the left in Figure 3.7(a)),
which completes the first inner loop. In the next clock cycle, A0 and B1 are multiplied in
multiplier 1, and simultaneously, A1 and B0 are multiplied in multiplier 2 (‘×’ block on the
right in Figure 3.7(a)), which completes the second inner loop. Notice in Figure 3.8 that the
last column of every other section, the RAM access for multiplier 2 is not needed. Thus,
Figure 3.7(a) shows a multiplexer to input ‘0’ into the adder when necessary.
The output of the ‘×’ blocks are accumulated in the 63-bit ‘UV register’. The addition
operation is performed using XOR operations. Once the inner loop is completed, which
corresponds to the vertical bars in Figure 3.8, the least-significant 32 bits of ‘UV register’
are sent to the ‘FIFO C’ or ‘SIPO C’ for storage and the register is right-shifted by 32 bits
to prepare for the next inner loop calculation.
The ‘FIFO C’ and ‘SIPO C’ blocks are both connected to the output port. The ‘FIFO
C’ block is a first-in first-out register that collects the least significant s 32-bit digits of the
product, where s = dm/32e. The ‘SIPO C’ block is a serial-in parallel-out shift register that
collects the most significant s 32-bit digits of the product. When multiplication is complete,
the product of 2s 32-bit digits, are output from the MULT block through ports ‘C’ and
‘C msd’. Port ‘C’ outputs the least significant s digits on a 32-bit bus and ‘C msd’ outputs
the most significant digits of the product in a bus of up to 565 bits wide. The ‘C msd’ port is
connected directly to the SA block, where it is concatenated with the least significant digits
after the addition operation. By doing so, the SA block requires only s clock cycles to load
input values, even when the input is a 2s-digit product from the MULT block.
One special characteristic of the SA block is its ability to perform repeated squaring with
52
1
8
x3
2
R
A
M A
1
8
x3
2
R
A
M B
X
+
U
V
 r
eg
is
te
r
X
3
2
3
2
6
3
6
3
6
3
3
2
A
B
C
6
3
FI
FO
 C
3
2
3
2
SI
P
O
 C
5
6
5
C
_m
sd
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
0
(a
)
B
lo
ck
d
ia
gr
am
of
th
e
m
u
lt
ip
li
er
(M
U
L
T
)
b
lo
ck
.
R
1
6
3
+
A
B
SR
E
G
 C
R
23
3
R
2
8
3
R
40
9
R
5
7
1
16
3
23
3
28
3
40
9
5
71
32
5
46
5
5
6
5
81
7
1
1
4
1
SQ
C
3
2
32
32
32
5
7
1
57
6
B
_f
ul
l
5
6
5
s_
o
u
t
p
_
o
u
t
p
_
in
s_
in
(b
)
B
lo
ck
d
ia
g
ra
m
o
f
th
e
sq
u
a
re
-a
d
d
(S
A
)
b
lo
ck
.
F
ig
u
re
3
.7
:
B
lo
ck
d
ia
gr
am
of
P
ar
al
le
li
ze
d
F
in
it
e
F
ie
ld
A
ri
th
m
et
ic
B
lo
ck
s.
53
Multiplier 1
Address A
Address B
Multiplier 2
Address A
Address B
0
0
0
1
0
2
1
1
0
3
1
2
0
4
1
3
2
2
0
5
1
4
2
3
1
5
2
4
3
3
2
5
3
4
3
5
4
4
4
5
5
5
0
1
0
2
0
3
1
2
0
4
1
3
0
5
1
4
2
3
1
5
2
4
2
5
3
4
3
5
4
5
Figure 3.8: The RAM addresses read in the MULT block for 163-bit operation.
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Figure 3.9: Block diagram of the 1-MULT Koblitz ECP.
only 1 addition clock cycle per squaring. The value to be squared is input in the SA block
through port ‘A’ as 32-bit digits and collected in ‘SREG C’. The complete operand is then
squared through the ‘SQ’ block and reduced through the reduction blocks in 1 clock cycle.
This feature is useful in reducing the latency of the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm for inversion, where
multiple successive squaring operations are required.
Figure 3.9 shows the top level block diagram of the parallelized scalable ECP for Koblitz
curves, also referred to as ‘1-MULT Koblitz ECP’ in this thesis. Notice in Figure 3.9 that
the result of the MULT block does not get stored back into the RAM. Instead, the product
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Figure 3.10: FSM of the 1-MULT Koblitz ECP.
enters the SA block through the ‘B full’ input and through the multiplexer into the ‘B’
input. Furthermore, the reduction step of the multiplication is not computed until the next
multiplication has started and it is computed in the SA block. By doing so, there is no need
to store the result of the multiplication before reduction and the latency is reduced since the
reduction steps are masked by the latency of the next multiplication, which is computed in
parallel.
Due to the ability of the SA block to perform repeated squaring efficiently, the τNAF
point multiplication algorithm in Algorithm 2.3 has been modified such that the PFRB and
PADD operations are combined forming the PDQA state in the finite state machine (FSM)
of the ECP, which is shown in Figure 3.10. The PQUAD state performs a series of PFRB
operations to either square or double-square each coordinate. Furthermore, Table 3.4 shows
that the latency in number of clock cycles of the MULT block is higher than the latency of
the SA blocks. The lowest ratio of tMULT:tSA occurs in the 163-bit case, where the ratio is
4.29. Thus, up to 4 SA block operations may be executed during the execution of a single
MULT block operation.
The operations executed in each state of the FSM is shown in Table 3.5. In Table 3.5,
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Table 3.4: Latency in number of clock cycles of the MULT and SA blocks.
m tMULT tSA Ratio (tMULT:tSA)
163 30 7 4.29
233 47 9 5.22
283 57 10 5.70
409 107 14 7.64
571 192 19 10.1
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Figure 3.11: Data dependency graph of PDQA for 1-MULT Koblitz ECP.
MULT PC and SA PC refer to the program counter for the MULT block and the SA block,
respectively. The symbol ‘|’ signifies that the operand or operation is selected based on certain
conditions set by the controller. As previously mentioned, every MULT block operation must
be followed by a reduction in the SA block. Thus, when SA PC is 0, the operand M is used
to input the product of the MULT block.
In order to take advantage of the ECP architecture shown in Figure 3.9, the data de-
pendency of the Koblitz curve operations in the PDQA state are analyzed to optimize the
usage of the MULT and SA blocks and shown in Figure 3.11. The numbers shown inside the
dashed-line loops in Figure 3.11 correspond to the MULT PC values in Table 3.5. Notice
that 0 appears at the left and at the right because the final operation to obtain Y1 is not
executed until the beginning of the next iteration. By doing so, its latency is masked by the
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Table 3.5: Instructions executed by the 1-MULT Koblitz ECP
MULT PC MULT SA PC SA
PDQA State
0 x× (Z1|R) 0 Y1 = T1 + (Y1|M)
1 T2 = Z
2
1
2 X1 = X
(2|4)
1
1 T2 × (y|xy) 0 T1 = X1 +M
1 Y1 = Y
(2|4)
1
2 T1 × Z1 0 X1 = Y1 +M
1 T1 = T
2
1
3 0 Z1 = 0 +M
4 X1 ×R 0 Y1 = Z1 + a · T2
1 Z1 = Z
2
1
5 T1 × Y1 0 T2 = 0 +M
1 X1 = X
2
1
6 x× Z1 0 Y1 = T2 +M
1 T3 = Z
2
1
2 X1 = X1 + Y1
7 T3 × (xy|y) 0 T3 = X1 +M
1 T2 = Z1 + T2
8 T2 × T3 0 T1 = 0 +M
1 Z1 = Z
(2|4)
1
PQUAD State
0 0 Y1 = T1 + (Y1|M)
1 Y1 = R
(4|2)
1
2 X1 = X
(4|2)
1
3 Z1 = Z
(4|2)
1
BX State
0 0 Y1 = T1 + Y1|R
ISQ State
0 0 R = (Z1|R)2r
IMULT State
0 (Z1|T3)×R 0
IRED State
0 0 T3 = 0 +M
FMULT State
0 X1 ×R 0 T3 = R2
1 Y1 × T3 0 T1(x3) = 0 +M
FINAL State
0 0 T2(y3) = 0 +M
MULT block operation. The X
(2|4)
1 , Y
(2|4)
1 , and Z
(2|4)
1 operations shown in loops indexed 0, 1
and 8 in Figure 3.11 are PFBR operations for each coordinate that is executed in the PDQA
state. The ‘R’ blocks correspond to reduction operations that are performed by adding 0+M
as shown in Table 3.5. The ‘+∗’ block corresponds to Y1 = Z1 + a · T2 when MULT PC is
4 and SA PC is 0. Since a is either 0 or 1, the multiplication is replaced with a conditional
addition of T2.
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Figure 3.12: Block diagram of the revised SA block to support 2 MULT blocks.
To further reduce the latency of the described design, another ECP has been designed,
where a second MULT block is instantiated to further parallelize the point operations. This
ECP is referred to as ‘2-MULT Koblitz ECP’ in this thesis. The design requires the SA
block to replicate the ‘SREG C’ block to accommodate 2 MULT block results to be reduced
simultaneously. The revised design of the SA block, shown in Figure 3.12, also uses an extra
adder to allow for the extra MULT block result to be added to another argument before
it is reduced. The revised SA block also has 2 outputs, ‘C1’ and ‘C2’ to output 2 reduced
products simultaneously.
The block diagram of the 2-MULT Koblitz ECP is shown in Figure 3.13. The 2-MULT
Koblitz ECP replicates the MULT block and uses the revised SA block in Figure 3.12 for
reduction and addition. The ‘C1’ and ‘C2’ output ports of the SA port are connected back
to the RAM and the byte-write feature of the Xilinx BRAM block allows for both reduced
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Table 3.6: Instructions executed by the 2-MULT Koblitz ECP
MULT PC MULT 1 MULT 2 SA PC SA 1 SA 2
PDQA State
0 M1 = x× (Z1|R1) 0 Y1 = (Y1|M1) + (0|T1)
1 T2 = Z
2
1
2 X1 = X
(2|4)
1
1 0 R1 = M1 +X1
2 M1 = R1 × Z1 M2 = T2 × (y|xy) 0 T1 = R21
1 Y1 = Y
(2|4)
1
3 0 T3 = M1 + 0 X1 = M2 + Y1
1 Y1 = R1 + T2 · a
2 Z1 = T
2
3
4 M1 = T1 × Y1 M2 = X1 × T3 0 X1 = X21
1 T3 = Z
2
1
5 M1 = x× Z1 M2 = T3 × (xy|y) 0 R1 = M1 + 0 T2 = M2 + 0
1 R1 = R1 +R2
2 X1 = R1 +X1
3 T2 = Z1 + T2
6 0 R1 = M1 +X1 T1 = M2 + 0
7 M1 = T2 ×R1 0 Z1 = Z(2|4)1
PQUAD State
0 0 R1 = (Y1|M1) + (0|T1)
1 Y1 = R
(4|2)
1
2 X1 = X
(4|2)
1
3 Z1 = Z
(4|2)
1
BX State
0 0 Y1 = (Y1|M1) + (0|T1)
ISQ State
0 0 R1 = (Z1|R1)2r
IMULT State
0 M1 = R1 × (Z1|T3) 0
IRED State
0 0 T3 = M1 + 0
FMULT State
0 0 R1 = R
2
1
1 M1 = R1 × Y1 M2 = X1 × T3 0
FINAL State
0 0 T2(y3) = M1 + 0 T1(x3) = M2 + 0
values to be written to the RAM simultaneously.
Using the data dependency graph of Figure 3.11, the grouping of the MULT and SA
block operations can be modified to use 2 MULT blocks simultaneously. The sequence of
instructions executed for each state of the 2-MULT Koblitz ECP can be found in Table 3.6.
One can notice that the use of 2 MULT blocks only reduces the number of groups of
operations from 9 to 8. However, in Table 3.5, when MULT PC is 3 the MULT block is not
used, so the latency of the PDQA state is 7tMULT + tSA. In comparison, in Table 3.6, when
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Table 3.7: Implementation Results and Comparison of the Parallelized Scalable ECPs
for Koblitz Curves
Work FPGA Registers LUT Slices BRAM
Max.
Freq.
(MHz)
m
Latency
(ms)
Efficiency(
ECPM
s·slice
)
1-MULT
Koblitz
ECP
Virtex-5
XC5LX110T 1,704 7,073 2,199 5 223.46
163 0.068 6.669
233 0.149 3.053
283 0.215 2.112
409 0.566 0.803
571 1.391 0.327
2-MULT
Koblitz
ECP
Virtex-5
XC5LX110T 3,134 8,609 2,708 5 222.67
163 0.055 6.760
233 0.114 3.228
283 0.163 2.267
409 0.409 0.903
571 0.973 0.380
Koblitz
ECP
Virtex-5
XC5LX110T 1,401 3,003 1,246 8 206.27
163 0.206 3.903
233 0.455 1.764
283 0.554 1.449
409 1.451 0.553
571 3.266 0.246
MULT PC is 1, 3 or 6, neither MULT block is in use, so the latency is 5tMULT + 5tSA, which
is lower than the 1-MULT case.
Table 3.7 shows the implementation results of the above mentioned parallelized Koblitz
curve scalable ECPs on the Virtex-5 FPGA. The table also shows the results of the Koblitz
ECP described in Section 3.2.1 implemented on the same Virtex-5 FPGA. From Table 3.7,
one can see that the 1-MULT Koblitz ECP has a much lower latency than the Koblitz ECP
due to the use of a separate SA block to perform reduction. Even though the hardware
resource utilization of the 1-MULT Koblitz ECP is higher, the efficiency metric shows that
it is more efficient than the Koblitz ECP. Table 3.7 also shows the comparison between the
1-MULT Koblitz ECP and the 2-MULT Koblitz ECP. As expected, the 2-MULT Koblitz
ECP requires more registers (3,134 compared to 1,704) and slices (2,708 compared to 2,199),
but it is able to further reduce the latency of the ECPM. Using the efficiency metric, one can
see that the 2-MULT Koblitz ECP slightly outperforms the 1-MULT counterpart.
3.3.2 Parallelization of Scalable ECP over Pseudo-Random Curves
Similar to the parallelized Koblitz ECP implementations described in Section 3.3.1, the
parallelized pseudo-random ECPs use 1 and 2 MULT blocks, respectively. These are referred
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Figure 3.14: Block diagram of the 1-MULT Random ECP.
to as ‘1-MULT Random ECP’ and ‘2-MULT Random ECP’ in this thesis. The difference
between the Koblitz curve implementation and the pseudo-random curve implementation is
in the design of the finite state machine (FSM) in the controller and the instructions that
are operated.
The block diagram of the 1-MULT Random ECP is shown in Figure 3.14. It highly
resembles the block diagram shown in Figure 3.9, with the exception that the controller does
not require ks, since the value of k is represented in binary and the temporary values in the
RAM are different.
The FSM and the operations executed by the 1-MULT Random ECP are shown in Fig-
ure 3.15 and Table 3.8, respectively. From Figure 3.15, it can be seen that the FSM is very
similar to its Koblitz counterpart shown in Figure 3.10. The differences are in the states
that evaluate the main loop of the ECPM. The IDLE, LOAD, FINAL, WAIT and inversion
states are the same as in the Koblitz ECPs. As in the Koblitz ECP implementations, the
data dependency graph is used to optimize the ECPM operations. The data dependency
graph of the LOOP state is shown in Figure 3.16. The LOOP state executes the Madd and
Mdouble operations shown in Equations (2.13) and (2.14). As in Figure 3.11, the numbers
in the dashed-line loops correspond to the MULT PC values in Table 3.8. Notice that in
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Figure 3.15: FSM of the 1-MULT Random ECP.
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Figure 3.16: Data dependency graph of LOOP for the 1-MULT Random ECP.
Table 3.8 some of the operations select between different X1 and X2 or Z1 and Z2. These are
conditionally selected based on the bit of k to perform the if statement in the Lopez-Dahab
algorithm in Algorithm 2.2.
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Figure 3.17: Data dependency graph of coordinate conversion for the 1-MULT Ran-
dom ECP.
One of the improvements made on the 1-MULT Random ECP over the Random ECP
discussed in Section 3.2.2 is the projective to affine coordinate conversion. The improvement
modifies the Mxy operation shown in Algorithm 2.2 into the following:
x0 ← xZ2X1xZ1Z2
y0 ← (Z2(xZ1+X1)xZ1Z2 )(
x(xZ1+X1)(xZ2+X2)
xZ1Z2
+ x2 + y) + y
(3.6)
By doing so, only 1 finite field inversion is needed, for xZ1Z2, to perform the conversion as
opposed to 3 individual inversions for x, Z1 and Z2. Since the latency of the inversion is much
higher than that of multiplication, the conversion algorithm in Equation (3.6) requires fewer
clock cycles than in Algorithm 2.2. Using the data dependency graph shown in Figure 3.17
the operations of the coordinate conversion are optimized for the MULT and SA block.
The states MUL1, MUL1R, MUL2 and MUL2R are used to prepare the value to be
inverted, which is xZ1Z2. The product of x×Z2 is evaluated first and stored in the temporary
variable T2 to be used during the CONV state. The inversion of xZ1Z2 is evaluated during
the inversion states and the operations of the CONV state are grouped by the MULT PC
values shown in Figure 3.17.
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Table 3.8: Instructions executed by the 1-MULT Random ECP
MULT PC MULT SA PC SA
INIT State
0 0 Z2 = x
2
1 R = R2
LOOP State
0 (X1|X2)× (Z2|Z1) 0 (X2|X1) = (M |R) + (T2|b)
1 T3 = (Z1|Z2)4
1 (X2|X1)× (Z1|Z2) 0 T2 = M + 0
2 (X1|X2)× (Z1|Z2) 0 T1 = M + 0
3 T2 × T1 0 R = M + 0
1 (Z1|Z2) = R2
2 T1 = T1 + T2
4 b× T3 0 T2 = M + 0
1 (Z2|Z1) = T 21
2 T3 = (X1|X2)4
5 x× (Z2|Z1) 0 (X1|X2) = M + T3
MUL1 State
0 x× Z2 0 (X2|X1) = M + T2
MUL1R State
0 0 T2 = M + 0
MUL2 State
0 R× Z1 0
MUL2R State
0 0 T1 = M + 0
ISQ State
0 0 R = R2
r
IMULT State
0 R× (T1|T3) 0
IRED State
0 0 T3 = M + 0
CONV State
0 x× Z1 0 T3 = R2
1 T1 = X2 + T2
1 T2 × T3 0 T2 = M +X1
2 T2 × T3 0 Z1 = M + 0
3 x× T1 0 T1 = M + 0
4 T1 × Z2 0 T3 = M + 0
5 T1 × T3 0 T1 = M + 0
1 R = x2
2 T3 = R + y
6 X1 × Z1 0 T2 = M + T3
7 T2 × T1 0 T1(x3) = M + 0
FINAL State
0 0 R(y3) = M + y
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Table 3.9: Instructions executed by the 2-MULT Random ECP
MULT PC MULT 1 MULT 2 SA PC SA 1 SA 2
INIT State
0 0 Z2 = (x+ 0)
2
1 R1 = (R1 + 0)
2
2 X2 = R1 + b
LOOP State
0 M1 = (X1|R1)× Z2 M2 = (X2|R1)× Z1 0 T3 = (Z1|Z2 + 0)4
1 M1 = (X1|X2)× (Z1|Z2)M2 = T3 × b 0 T1 = M1 + 0 T2 = M2 + 0
1 (Z2|Z1) = (R1 +R2)2
2 T3 = (0 + (X1|X2))4
2 M1 = x× (Z2|Z1) M2 = T2 × T1 0 R1 = M1 + 0 (X1|X2) = M2 + T3
1 (Z1|Z2) = (R1 + 0)2
MUL1 State
0 M1 = x× Z2 0 R1 = M1 + 0 R2 = M2 + 0
1 (X2|X1) = R1 +R2
MUL1R State
0 M1 = x× Z1 0 T2 = M1 + 0
MUL2 State
0 M1 = T2 × Z1 0 Z1 = M1 +X1
1 X2 = T2 +X2
MUL2R State
0 0 T1 = M1 + 0
ISQ State
0 0 (R1|T3) = (R1 + 0)2r
IMULT State
0 M1 = R1 × (T1|T3) 0
IRED State
0 0 T3 = M1 + 0
CONV State
0 M1 = x×X2 M2 = R1 × Z1 0
1 M1 = T2 × T3 0 T3 = M1 + 0 T2 = M2 + 0
1 T1 = (x+ 0)
2
2 M1 = T2 × Z2 M2 = T2 × T3 0 T2 = M1 + 0
1 T3 = T1 + y
3 0 R1 = M1 + 0 R2 = M2 + T3
4 M1 = R1 ×R2 M2 = T2 ×X1 0
FINAL State
0 0 T1(y3) = M1 + y T2(x3) = M2 + 0
The 2-MULT Random ECP is also designed in a similar fashion as its Koblitz curve
counterpart. The block diagram of the 2-MULT Random ECP is shown in Figure 3.18.
Similar to the 2-MULT Koblitz ECP, the 2-MULT Random ECP also uses the revised SA
block shown in Figure 3.12 for reduction and addition. Due to the data dependency in the
Lopez-Dahab algorithm used in pseudo-random curves, the 6 MULT block operations in the
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Table 3.10: Implementation Results and Comparison of the Parallelized Scalable
ECPs for Pseudo-Random Curves
Work FPGA Registers LUT Slices BRAM
Max.
Freq.
(MHz)
m
Latency
(ms)
Efficiency(
ECPM
s·slice
)
1-MULT
Random
ECP
Virtex-5
XC5LX110T
1,650 7,128 2,290 5 224.84
163 0.135 3.246
233 0.299 1.460
283 0.440 0.993
409 1.186 0.368
571 2.965 0.147
2-MULT
Random
ECP
Virtex-5
XC5LX110T
3,118 8,784 2,708 5 223.26
163 0.080 4.626
233 0.172 2.148
283 0.250 1.479
409 0.652 0.567
571 1.593 0.232
Random
ECP
Virtex-5
XC5LX110T
1,225 3,191 1,150 5 181.19
163 0.380 2.290
233 0.860 1.011
283 1.105 0.787
409 3.037 0.286
571 7.243 0.120
LOOP state can all be parallelized, so in the 2-MULT Random ECP, the LOOP state only
requires 3tMULT instead of 6tMULT. This modification reduces the LOOP state latency by 50%
with only a slight increase in hardware utilization. The operations executed in the 2-MULT
Random ECP are shown in Table 3.9.
The implementation results of the above mentioned ECPs are shown in Table 3.10. The
Virtex-5 implementation result of the Random ECP described in Section 3.2.2 is also included
for comparison purposes. As expected, Table 3.10 shows that the 1-MULT Random ECP
is more efficient than the Random ECP, as it parallelizes the multiplication and reduction
operations. Table 3.10 also shows the improvement of the 2-MULT Random ECP over the
1-MULT counterpart. Comparing the results in Table 3.7 and in Table 3.10, one can see
that the parallelization to 2 MULT blocks is more efficient for pseudo-random curves than
for Koblitz curves. From Table 3.10, it can be seen that the efficiency improvement of the
2-MULT Random ECP is between 43% and 57%, whereas the improvement of the 2-MULT
Koblitz ECP is only between 1.4% to 16%.
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3.4 Low Latency Scalable ECC Processor for Binary
Curves5
Despite the lower latency of the ECPs described in Section 3.3 compared to the ones in Sec-
tion 3.2, the former ECPs have one drawback. The implementation of the Comba algorithm
for multiplication in the MULT block results in a latency in the order of O(s2), where s is
the number of 32-bit digits. Thus, for large key sizes, the latency increases quadratically
with respect to the number of 32-bit digits. The ECPs presented in this section redesigns the
MULT and SA blocks to improve the latency of the ECPM operation on high bit lengths.
The work described in this section is published in [53] and are referred to as ‘Low-Latency
Koblitz ECP’ and ‘Low-Latency Random ECP’ in this thesis. Collectively, the 2 ECPs are
referred to as ‘Low-Latency ECPs’.
The MULT block of the Low-Latency ECPs is shown in Figure 3.19(a). It uses the
Karatsuba-Ofman multiplication algorithm described in Equation (2.22). However, instead of
implementing a 571-bit parallel multiplier, the MULT block of the Low-Latency ECPs divides
the 571-bit operand into 3 191-bit parts and evaluates each 191-bit multiplication on every
clock cycle. The 191-bit multiplier is in turn a combinational Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier
applied recursively, with 2 levels of pipelining built into it. Thus, each 571-bit multiplication
requires only 9 clock cycles. Since operands with fewer bits can be evaluated with the same
hardware by setting the MSBs to 0, the multiplier can support all multiplications up to 571
bits. The result of each partial multiplication is accumulated in the ‘C register’ and output
as a single wide bus from the MULT block through port ‘C’.
The SA block, as shown in Figure 3.19(b), has been modified from the version in Fig-
ure 3.7(b) to use a full length 1141-bit port ‘A’ for the result of the MULT block and a
571-bit ‘B’ port for other operands. The reduction blocks in Figure 3.19(b) are the same
as the ones used in Figure 3.7(b). Since the complete operand is available at the input of
the SA block, the latency of the SA block is 2 clock cycles regardless of the key size. Since
the tMULT:tSA ratio is 9:2 = 4.5, up to 4 SA block operations may execute in parallel with a
5The work in this section has been publihsed in ISCAS 2014 [53].
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Figure 3.20: Block diagram of the Low-Latency Random ECP.
MULT block operation. Thus, the algorithms shown in Table 3.5 and Table 3.8 can be used
without further modifications.
The block diagram of the Low-Latency Random ECP is shown in Figure 3.20. The
biggest difference between Figure 3.20 and the ECPs discussed in Section 3.3 is that 571-bit
registers are used in Figure 3.20 instead of a RAM. This is due to output of the SA block
being a 571-bit port instead of 32-bit digits. The block diagram of the Low-Latency Koblitz
ECP is similar with the exception that it has an additional input for the sign bit of the
scalar multiplier k of the ECPM. This input, ‘ks’, is connected to the Controller shown in
Figure 3.20. In addition, the ROM for the constant b is not necessary in the Low-Latency
Koblitz ECP.
The implementation results of the Low-Latency ECPs are shown in Table 3.11. The
implementation of these ECPs requires a much higher number of hardware resources since it
implements much wider multipliers. However, it reduces the latency of the ECPM due to the
reduced latency of the MULT block using the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm for multiplication.
Using the efficiency metric and comparing the results in Table 3.7 and Table 3.10 with
Table 3.11, one can see that the Low Latency ECPs are less efficient than the 2-MULT ECPs
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Table 3.11: Implementation Results of the Low-Latency ECPs
Work FPGA Registers LUT Slices BRAM
Max.
Freq.
(MHz)
m
Latency
(ms)
Efficiency(
ECPM
s·slice
)
Low-Latency
Koblitz
ECP
Virtex-5
XC5LX110T
13,076 26,111 7,427 0 162.07
163 0.029 4.599
233 0.042 3.213
283 0.050 2.667
409 0.073 1.855
571 0.101 1.331
Low-Latency
Random
ECP
Virtex-5
XC5LX110T
12,983 24,974 7,978 0 154.35
163 0.059 2.119
233 0.084 1.489
283 0.102 1.228
409 0.147 0.852
571 0.205 0.611
for lower bit lengths (i.e. 163 and 233 in Koblitz; 163, 233 and 283 in pseudo-random). For
higher bit lengths, the Low-Latency ECPs have a higher efficiency. This result is expected
since the latency of the implemented Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier is constant instead of
increasing quadratically with the number of 32-bit digits. The lower efficiency at lower bit
lengths is a results of a slower maximum clock frequency due to the increased complexity
of the 191-bit multiplier. Thus, the advantage of the reduced latency is more apparent in
higher bit lengths than in lower bit lengths.
Unlike the ECPs described in Section 3.3, the parallelization of the MULT block in the
Low-Latency ECPs would not be feasible because the hardware resource utilization of the
MULT block is relatively high compared to the 32-bit MULT block shown in Figure 3.7(a).
Thus, the implementation of a 2-MULT ECP using Figure 3.19(a) would reduce the latency,
but increase the number of slices such that the efficiency of the overall ECP would decrease.
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Chapter 4
Scalable ECC Processor for Prime Curves1
In the previous chapter, only the binary field curves recommended by NIST have been
discussed. In this chapter, the design and implementation of a scalable ECP for the 5 NIST
recommended prime curves are discussed. The work described in this chapter is available
in [54] and is referred to as ‘Prime ECP’ in this thesis. As mentioned in Section 2.3, the
main difference between prime field and binary field arithmetic is the carry propagation of
addition, which influences all other arithmetic operations. This chapter is divided into 2
sections: Section 4.1 presents the design and architecture of the Prime ECP; Section 4.2
shows the implementation results and the comparison with another scalable prime ECP in
the current literature.
4.1 Design and Architecture
From the lessons learned from the binary ECPs, the Prime ECP also parallelizes the mul-
tiplication and the reduction steps. Since the squaring operation cannot be simplified to
interleaving zeros as in the binary case, squaring is performed as a multiplication of identical
operands. Thus, the finite field arithmetic blocks of the Prime ECP consist of the MULT
and the addition/subtraction/reduction (AR) block.
The block diagram of the MULT and AR blocks are shown in Figure 4.1. Notice that the
architecture of both the MUTL and AR blocks are built with the DSP48E slices described
in Section 2.4 because they have built-in 25 × 18-bit hardware multipliers that can be used
instead of designing multipliers using FPGA fabric that generally have lower performance.
1The work in this chapter has been accepted to IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI)
Systems [54].
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The MULT block implements the Comba algorithm (Algorithm 2.4) using 17-bit digits.
The reason for choosing 17-bit digits instead of 32-bit digits is to take advantage of the 17-bit
shifted feedback input available in the DSP48E slices. As can be seen in Figure 4.1(a), the
MULT block inputs the operands ‘A’ and ‘B’ as 17-bit digits and stores the values in 31×17-
bit RAMs. The RAM values are read into the multiplier of the DSP48E slice according to the
indexes in the Comba algorithm. Since the multiplier in the DSP48E slices is a 25× 18 bits,
the 17-bit operands are zero padded. Inside the DSP48E slice, the product of the multiplier
is accumulated in the internal ‘P’ register. The 17-bit shifted value is chosen when an inner
loop of the Comba algorithm is completed. Simultaneously, the lower 17 bits of the product
are shifted into the FIFO or the shift register. The FIFO and the shift register operate in a
similar fashion as the ones in Figure 3.7(a).
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, due to the choice of the prime numbers, the reduction
operation can be simplified to a series of modular additions and subtractions. Thus, the
addition and subtraction operations are built into the architecture of the reduction operation
forming the AR block shown in Figure 4.1(b). Since the reduction algorithms for the NIST
recommended prime numbers access the operand in 32-bit digits, the AR block collects the
input values as 17-bit operands and stores them in registers. ‘A Reg’ is a 1042-bit register to
accommodate the product of 2 521-bit values, and ‘A add Reg’ and ‘A sub Reg’ are 527-bit
(d521/17e × 17 = 527) registers that store the operands to be added and subtracted. Thus,
the AR block performs the operation ‘A Reg’ + ‘A add Reg’ − ‘A sub Reg’ (mod p).
The AR block uses 3 DSP48E slices to perform the first stage of addition, subtraction
and reduction. These DSP48E slices are cascaded such that they compute the operation:
[A0:B0] + C0 + C2 − ([A1:B1] + C1), where the operands correspond to the input ports of
the DSP48E slice. Each operand is a 32-bit digit extracted from the input registers and zero-
padded to 48 bits. Notice that the multiplier of the DSP48E slice is bypassed, so the DSP48E
slice is used as a 48-bit arithmetic block. The multiplexers on the left of Figure 4.1(b) are
used to select these 32-bit digits according to the reduction algorithm of the specific prime
number. For example, consider the case of the 192-bit prime number. The sequence of digits
selected for each input is shown in Table 4.1.
The operation of the AR block is separated into digits and passes in Table 4.1. The digit
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Table 4.1: Operation sequence for the addition/subtraction/reduction (AR) block for
p192
Digit 0 1 2 3 4 5
Pass 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
C0 add0 0 add0 0 add0 a6 add0 a6 add0 a4 add0 a4
A1:B1 sub0 0 sub0 0 sub0 0 sub0 0 sub0 0 sub0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A2:B2 a0 a10 a0 a10 a0 a8 a0 a8 a0 a6 a0 a6
C2 a6 0 a6 0 a4 0 a4 0 0 0 0 0
column indicates the index of the output digit that is being computed. The pass column
indicates the sequence of values input to the 3 DSP48E slices. In Table 4.1, during the 0th
pass of the 0th digit, the 0th digit of ‘A add Reg’ (add0) is selected for C0, the 0
th digit of
‘A sub Reg’ (sub0) is selected for [A1:B1], 0 is input into C1, the 0
th digit of ‘A Reg’ (a0) for
[A2:B2] and the 6th digit (a6) for C2. Once the 0
th and 1st passes are complete for digit 0,
the input registers are shifted by 32 bits, such that add1 becomes add0, sub1 becomes sub0,
a1 becomes a0, etc. By doing so, when evaluating the result of digit 1, the multiplexer selects
add0 and sub0 again for C0 and [A1:B1], respectively. Using this method, the size of the
multiplexers is reduced.
The resultant digits of the reduction are accumulated in ‘Z Reg’ to be used by the second
stage of the AR block, which performs the final (mod p) of the reduction algorithm and
converts the result back to 17-bit digits. ‘Z Reg’ is a 544-bit (d521/32e × 32 = 544) register.
At the completion of the series of additions and subtractions at the first half of the AR block,
at most 1 extra 17-bit digit can be produced (stored in ‘Z Carry’). Thus, the second stage of
the AR block performs the reduction of the 1 extra digit. Since ‘Z Reg’ outputs 17-bit digits,
the ‘shift’ input is a 1-hot value (i.e. only 1 bit is asserted in the number) that is multiplied
to ‘Z Carry’ to shift the extra digit accordingly for reduction. The top-right DSP48E unit in
Figure 4.1(b) is used to handle carryout bits from each digit to be carried to the next digit.
The result of the AR block is output through port ‘C’ as 17-bit digits.
The block digram of the Prime ECP is shown in Figure 4.2. The architecture of the ECP
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Figure 4.2: Block diagram of the Prime ECP.
Table 4.2: Latency in number of clock cycles of the MULT and AR blocks in the
Prime ECP.
m tMULT tSA Ratio (tMULT:tSA)
163 145 32 4.53
233 197 36 5.47
283 257 48 5.35
409 530 67 7.91
571 962 56 17.2
is very similar to the ones presented in Section 3.3, except the RAM handles 17-bit digits
instead of 32-bit digits. The RAM is 8 × 18 = 144 bits wide instead of 8 × 17 = 136 bits
because of the use of the byte-writing capability on the Xilinx Block RAMs (BRAMs).
The latency in clock cycles of the MULT and AR blocks is shown in Table 4.2. As in the
binary case, the ratio of tMULT:tSA shows that up to 4 AR operations may be executed simul-
taneously for each MULT operation. The double-and-add ECPM algorithm (Algorithm 2.1)
and Jacobian projective coordinates are used in the implementation of the prime ECP. Thus,
the data dependency graph is drawn for the PDBL and PADD operations shown in Equation
(2.16) and (2.15), respectively, to optimize the usage of the MULT and AR blocks. The data
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Figure 4.4: Data dependency graph of PADD of the Prime ECP.
dependency graph of the PDBL and PADD states are shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4,
respectively.
In the data dependency graphs, ‘ c’ signifies the modular left shift by c, or ×2c (mod p).
This operation can be very easily integrated into the AR block by using the ‘A msd’ input
for the shifted MSBs. Using the data dependency graph, the FSM and the instructions for
each state are shown in Figure 4.5 and Table 4.3.
Notice in Table 4.3 that the evaluation of the Y1 in each iteration is performed in the
beginning of the next iteration. This is the same technique used in the 1-MULT Koblitz
ECP described in Section 3.3.1. Furthermore, in the PDBL state when MULT PC is 6 and
AR PC is 2, the operation T3 = P1  1 + 0 − 1 is evaluated but does not appear in the
data dependency graph in Figure 4.3. The same expression appears in the PADD state when
78
IDLE LOAD PDBL PADD
UEVEN
WAIT
SUBT
load = 0
u is odd
u is even
v is even
load = 1
load = 0
load = 1
reset
INVS
k_count = 0
u is even
VEVEN
v is odd
FINAL
u = 1 | v = 1
cur_k = 1
u is odd
cur_k = 0 &
k_count ≠ 0
cur_k = 0 & k_count = 0
v is even
u is even
k_count ≠ 0
Figure 4.5: FSM of the Prime ECP.
MULT PC is 12 and AR PC is 2. This operation is used to set up for the inversion used in
the projective to affine coordinate conversion.
The instructions executed for inversion are shown in Table 4.4. In the Prime ECP,
inversion is performed using the binary inversion algorithm (Algorithm 2.6). In Table 4.4,
the INVS state completes the evaluation of Y1 for the final iteration. There are 3 states
used for inversion. The Z1EVEN state corresponds to the while loop where u is even in
Algorithm 2.6. The T3EVEN state corresponds to the while loop where v is even, and the
SUBT state corresponds to the if statement for u ≥ v. The naming of the states is based on
the names of the registers used in the ECP. In other words, the value of u in Algorithm 2.6
is stored in Z1 during inversion and v is stored in T3.
In Table 4.4, ‘ 1’ signifies a right-shift by 1 bit or a modular division by 2. The right-
shift operation can be very easily handled by the AR block because the division by 2 of an
even number does not require the reduction step. During the Z1EVEN and T3EVEN states,
the operation is slightly modified from the expressions shown in Algorithm 2.6. Consider
the Z1EVEN state, the if statement in the while loop evaluates x1 ← x1/2 if x1 is even,
and x1 ← (x1 + p)/2, otherwise. In Table 4.4, T1 corresponds to x1 in Algorithm 2.6.
In the inversion implemented in the prime ECP, the expression (x1 + p)/2 is modified to
79
Table 4.3: Instructions executed during PDBL and PADD states by the Prime ECP
MULT PC MULT AR PC AR
PDBL State
0 Z1 × Z1 0 Y1 = M |0 + Y1 − 0
1 T3 = R 1 + 0− 0
1 T3 × Z1 0 T1 = M + 0− 0
1 T2 = 0 +X1 −R
2 T1 = T1 +X1 − 0
2 Y1 × Y1 0 Z1 = M + 0− 0
3 T1 × T2 0 T1 = M + 0− 0
1 T3 = R 2 + 0− 0
4 T3 ×X1 0 R = M + 0− 0
1 T2 = R 1 +R− 0
5 T2 × T2 0 T3 = M + 0− 0
1 X1 = R 1 + 0− 0
6 T1 × T1 0 X1 = M + 0−X1
1 T1 = 0 + T3 −R
2 T3 = P1  1 + 0− 1
7 T1 × T2 0 R = M + 0− 0
1 R = R 3 + 0− 0
2 T1 = 0 + 0−R
PADD State
0 Z1 × Z1 0 Y1 = M + Y1 − 0
1 1 T1 = M + 0− 0
2 Z1 ×R 0
3 T1 × x 0 T2 = M + 0− 0
4 T2 × y 0 T1 = M + 0−X1
5 T1 × Z1 0 T2 = M + 0− Y1
6 T1 × T1 0 Z1 = M + 0− 0
7 0 T3 = M + 0− 0
8 X1 ×R 0
9 T3 × T1 0 T3 = M + 0− 0
1 T1 = R 1 + 0− 0
10 T2 × T2 0 X1 = M + 0− 0
11 X1 × Y1 0 R = M + 0− T1
1 X1 = 0 +R−X1
2 T3 = 0 + T3 −R
12 T3 × T2 0 R = M + 0− 0
1 Y1 = 0 + 0−R
2 T3 = P1  1 + 0− 1
x1/2 + (p+ 1)/2, which is possible because both p and x1 are odd. Thus, instead of storing
p in the ECP and evaluating (p + 1)/2 at every iteration of the binary inversion algorithm,
(p+1)/2 is stored in P1 and added to x1/2 when AR PC is 2 in Z1EVEN. Recall the operation
T3 = P1  1 + 0− 1 in PDBL and PADD states discussed earlier. This operation evaluates
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Table 4.4: Instructions executed during inversion and FINAL states by the Prime
ECP
MULT PC MULT AR PC AR
INVS State
0 0 Y1 = M + Y1 − 0
Z1EVEN State
0 0 Z1 = 0 + Z1 − 0 1
1 R = 0 + T1 − 0 1
2 T1 = P1|0 +R− 0
T3EVEN State
0 0 T3 = 0 + T3 − 0 1
1 R = 0 + T2 − 0 1
2 T2 = P1|0 +R− 0
SUBT State
0 0 Z1|T3 = 0 + Z1|T3 − T3|Z1
1 T1|T2 = 0 + T1|T2 − T2|T1
FINAL State
0 T1|T2 × T1|T2 0
1 0 T2|T1 = M + 0− 0
2 X1 ×R 0
3 T1 × T2 0 T1 = M + 0− 0
4 0 R = M + 0− 0
5 Y1 ×R 0
6 0 T2 = M + 0− 0
T3 = P1 × 2− 1 = (p + 1)/2× 2− 1 = p, which initializes T3 to p (v ← p in Algorithm 2.6)
as required by the binary inversion algorithm.
4.2 Implementation Results
The implementation results on the Virtex-5 FPGA of the Prime ECP is shown in Table 4.5.
Notice that the latency values are higher compared to the binary counterpart (e.g. 2-MULT
Koblitz ECP or 2-MULT pseudo-random ECP), and hence the efficiencies are much lower.
One of the reasons for the lower performance is the more complex addition in prime fields
compared to binary fields. Another reason is the long latency due to the use of 17-bit digits
in the MULT block instead of 32-bit blocks. As previously mentioned, since the latency of
the Comba algorithm is in the order of O(s2), using fewer bits per digit results in a higher
number of digits, which increases the latency.
Table 4.5 also shows the Prime ECP uses 7 DSP48E slices. Out of these 7, 1 is used in
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Table 4.5: Implementation Results and Comparison of the Prime ECP
Work FPGA Registers LUT Slices BRAM DSP
Max.
Freq.
(MHz)
m
Latency
(ms)
Efficiency(
ECPM
s·slice
)
Prime
ECP
Virtex-4
XC4VFX100
3,545 12,435 7,020 4 8 181.95
192 2.361 0.060
224 3.663 0.039
256 5.457 0.026
384 16.31 0.009
521 38.73 0.004
Prime
ECP
Virtex-5
XC5LX110T
3,567 6,115 1,980 2 7 251.32
192 1.709 0.295
224 2.652 0.190
256 3.951 0.128
384 11.81 0.043
521 28.04 0.018
Ananyi
et al.
[42]
Virtex-4
XC4VFX100
n/a 31,946 20,793 1 32 60
192 4.8 0.010
224 5.8 0.008
256 6.9 0.007
384 19.9 0.002
521 45.6 0.001
the MULT block and 5 are used in the AR block as shown in Figure 4.1. The final DSP48E
slice is used in the controller to compare the Z1 and T3 values during the inversion states to
determine whether or not u ≥ v. Furthermore, it can be observed that with the use of the
DSP48E slices results in the use of fewer FPGA slices.
The Virtex-4 implementation result of the Prime ECP is also shown in Table 4.5. The
Virtex-4 implementation requires an extra DSP48E slices compared to the Virtex-5 because
the Virtex-4 version of the DSP48E slice does not support the Z − (X + Y + CARRYIN)
operation shown in Table 2.6. Thus, an extra DSP48E slice is used to perform the addition
of the ports [A1:B1] and C1.
The Virtex-4 implementation compared to the work in [42], which resembles the Prime
ECP since it also supports all 5 NIST recommended prime curves without the need to recon-
figure the hardware. As can be seen in Table 4.5, the design in [42] requires a higher number
of slices (20,793 compared to 7,020) and DSP48E slices (32 compared to 8). Furthermore, the
latency of the Prime ECP is also between 15% to 50% lower compared to [42]. The higher
performance of the Prime ECP is due to the lower datapath with of the finite field arithmetic
blocks. In [42], the authors implement a 265-bit adder/subtractor, an integer multiplier with
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a 521-bit reductor and a separate module to perform inversion. These result in a much higher
hardware resource utilization and lower maximum clock frequency.
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Chapter 5
Scalable and Unified ECC Processor
Based on the design of the scalable ECPs discussed in the previous chapters, an ECP
that supports all 15 NIST recommended elliptic curves [18] is implemented and described in
this chapter. In Section 5.1, the design and architecture of the ‘Scalable and Unified ECP’
is described with the details of its operation. This work has been submitted to a journal for
peer review in [68]. In Section 5.2, the interaction of the ECP described in Section 5.1 with
the Microblaze soft-core processor is discussed.
5.1 Design and Architecture1
Recall that this thesis defines a unified ECP as one that supports both binary and prime
fields on-the-fly. Throughout the development of the previously described ECPs for Koblitz,
pseudo-random and prime curves, the architectures of the ECPs have been kept as consistent
as possible in order to facilitate the integration into a scalable and unified ECP. Thus, one
can notice many similarities among the aforementioned ECP architectures. This section
describes an ECP that is able to support all 15 curves recommended by NIST [18] without
the need to reconfigure the hardware.
Recall from Section 2.4 that the DSP48E slices have the capability to perform both integer
addition and binary field addition, through the built-in configurable ALU. Thus, DSP48E
slices are used as building blocks for the finite field arithmetic units, similar to the prime
ECP described in Chapter 4.
The Scalable and Unified ECP uses the same structure as the previous ECPs by adopting
1The work in this section has been submitted to IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics [68] for peer
review.
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Figure 5.1: Block diagram of the MULT block for the Scalable and Unified ECP.
the use of parallel MULT and AR blocks. The block diagram of the MULT block is shown
in Figure 5.1. Since the DSP48E slices do not support binary field multiplication, separate
multiplier blocks are used for prime and binary field multiplication. The MULT block adopts
the dual multiplier block architecture used in Figure 3.7(a).
The ‘×’ block performs integer multiplication for prime fields and the ‘⊗’ block performs
polynomial multiplication for binary fields. The ‘⊗’ block is the same as the multiplier block
in Figure 3.7(a), which is a pipelined 32× 32-bit Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier.
Since the DSP48E slices only have 25×18-bit multipliers, in order to implement a 32×32-
bit integer multiplier, multiple DSP48E slices are needed. The DSP48E user guide [66]
describes the architecture of a 42×35-bit multiplier, which is used to implement the multiplier
shown in Figure 5.2(a). The ‘×’ block uses 4 DSP48E blocks in cascade and takes 6 clock
cycles to complete the first multiplication, but requires only 1 additional clock cycle for every
subsequent execution.
The 64-bit product from the multipliers is passed to the ‘add/accum/shift’ block that
performs addition, accumulation and shifting as per the Comba algorithm. Since the MULT
85
>>
D
SP
4
8
E
x
>
17
+
>
>D
SP
4
8
E
x
>
+
>
>
D
SP
4
8
E
x
>
17
a[
16
:0
]
b
[1
6
:0
]
>
Sh
if
t 
17
17
a[
31
:1
7
]
>
>
>
> >
17
a[
16
:0
]
17
b
[3
1
:1
7
]
> >
+
>
>D
SP
4
8
E
x
>
>
Sh
if
t 
17
17
a[
31
:1
7
]
>
>
>
z[
1
6
:0
]
z[
3
3
:1
7
]
z[
6
3
:3
4
]
m
0
m
1
m
2
m
3
(a
)
32
×
32
-b
it
in
te
ge
r
m
u
lt
ip
li
er
(‘
×’
b
lo
ck
).
+/
⊕
 
>
>D
SP
48
E
>
48
+/
⊕
 
>
>
D
SP
48
E
>
16
+/
⊕
 
>
>
D
SP
48
E
+/
⊕
 
>
>D
SP
48
E
16 48
>
>
0
[3
1
:0
]
z[
47
:3
2
]
z[
31
:0
]
a[
63
:4
8
]
b
[6
3
:4
8
]
a[
47
:0
]
b
[4
7
:0
]
aa
s0
aa
s1
aa
s2
aa
s3
(b
)
A
d
d
/
A
cc
u
m
/
S
h
if
t
F
ig
u
re
5
.2
:
B
lo
ck
d
ia
gr
am
b
lo
ck
s
u
se
d
in
th
e
M
U
L
T
b
lo
ck
of
th
e
S
ca
la
b
le
an
d
U
n
ifi
ed
E
C
P
.
86
block uses 32-bit digits, it cannot take advantage of the 17-bit shift built into the DSP48E
slices. Thus, the architecture shown in Figure 5.2(b) is used. Its architecture is based on
the 96-bit adder/subtractor and 96-bit accumulator shown in [66]. The blocks labeled ‘aas0’
and ‘aas1’ perform a 64-bit addition and the blocks labeled ‘aas2’ and ‘aas3’ perform a 64-
bit accumulation. The feedback of the accumulator is placed outside the DSP48E slice in
order for a multiplexer to be added to perform 32-bit right-shifting of the Comba algorithm.
For binary field operation, the ‘add/accum/shift’ block is configured to use the XOR gates
instead of integer addition. The carry signals (i.e. connection from ‘aas0’ to ‘aas1’ and from
‘aas2’ to ‘aas3’) are ignored by the DSP48E slice. The output of the ‘add/accum/shift’ block
is connected to a FIFO and a shift register. These blocks perform the same function as the
ones in Figure 3.7(a).
The block diagram of the AR block is shown in Figure 5.3. It performs the operation
‘A Reg’ + ‘B Reg’ − ‘C Reg’ (mod p) in prime fields and ‘A Reg’ + ‘B Reg’ + ‘C Reg’
(mod P (t)) in binary fields. Its architecture is similar to the AR block of the Prime ECP
shown in Figure 4.1(b). However, the AR block in Figure 5.3 implements a tree architecture
to eliminate the need for multiple passes for digit used in the AR block for the prime ECP.
For prime fields, upon examining Algorithm B.1 to Algorithm B.5 in Appendix B, one can
notice that at most 8 digits are added and at most 4 digits are subtracted in the reduction
algorithms. Thus, the DSP48E slices in Figure 5.3 labeled ‘a0’, ‘a1’, ‘a2’ and ‘a3’ are used
for addition and ‘s0’ and ‘s1’ are used for subtraction. The ‘as0’ block is used to input the
digits of ‘B Reg’ and ‘C Reg’. Since the DSP48E slices have the ability to input a 3rd operand
through the cascaded input ‘PCIN’, the adder tree is built to take advantage of this feature
to reduce the number of DSP48E slices required. At the top of the adder tree, the digits
are collected at the ‘Z FIFO’ block similar to ‘Z Reg’ in Figure 4.1(b). The second stage of
the AR block shown at the bottom-right corner of Figure 5.3 (‘f0’ and ‘f1’ blocks) performs
the final (mod p) operation of the reduction algorithms. Finally, the AR block outputs the
result as 32-bit digits.
For binary fields, the same architecture is used for reduction. The digits selected by the
DSP48E slices are based on the reduction matrix developed for Equation (2.24). However,
when using the DSP48E slices for logical operations (i.e. XOR), they do not support the 3rd
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Figure 5.3: Block diagram of the AR block for the Scalable and Unified ECP.
operand as in the integer addition and subtraction case. Thus, the slices ‘a1’ and ‘s1’ are
disabled and the remainder of the DSP48E slices are configured to perform XOR operations.
Since binary field operations do not generate carry bits, the ‘f0’ and ‘f1’ blocks do not modify
the value in the ‘Z FIFO’, yet they are still used to preserve the latency between the prime
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Table 5.1: Latencies in clock cycles of the MULT and AR blocks in the Scalable and
Unified ECP.
m tMULT tAR Ratio (tMULT:tAR)
Binary
163 34 23 1.48
233 51 27 1.89
283 61 29 2.10
409 111 37 3.00
571 196 47 4.17
Prime
192 34 23 1.48
224 42 25 1.68
256 51 27 1.89
384 97 35 2.77
521 177 45 3.93
field and binary field operations.
Other than addition, subtraction and reduction, the AR block also performs squaring in
binary fields because squaring is simply interleaving zero bits with operand bits. When the
AR block is used for squaring, the operand to be squared is stored in ‘A Reg’ with zero bits
interleaved and the reduction operation is performed. Thus, the latency of squaring using
the AR block is the same as addition and reduction. This feature cannot be applied to prime
fields, so squaring in prime field is performed by the MULT block.
Table 5.1 shows the latencies of the MULT and AR blocks for binary and prime fields.
As shown by the tMULT:tAR ratio column, unlike in previous ECPs, in some cases only 1 AR
block operation can completely finish its execution during the execution of a MULT block
operation. Thus, the execution of the MULT and AR blocks are modified slightly from the
previous ECPs. In previous ECPs, the MULT block operation initiates at the same time as
the AR block operations. Once all the AR operations complete, the AR block becomes idle
and waits for the MULT block to complete its operation. In the Scalable and Unified ECP,
the MULT and AR blocks begin their operations, depending on the sequence of instructions,
the block that completes its operations first becomes idle and waits for the other to complete.
By doing so, the ECP can still take advantage of parallel executions of the MULT and AR
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Figure 5.4: Block diagram of the Scalable and Unified ECP.
blocks.
The block digram of the Scalable and Unified ECP is shown in Figure 5.4. This architec-
ture is similar to the one used in the ECPs described in the previous chapters. The ‘k’ and ‘ks’
ports input the value of k for the ECPM. When the ECP is set to operate on pseudo-random
or prime curves, the ‘ks’ port is not used. The RAM is 18 × 288 bits to store the x and y
coordinates of the point to be multiplied and 7 other temporary variables (9× 32 = 288).
The top level FSM of the Scalable and Unified ECP is shown in Figure 5.5. The circular
shapes are individual states and the cloud shapes are collections of states. This FSM combines
the FSMs of the 1-MULT Koblitz ECP, 1-MULT Random ECP and the Prime ECP. The
IDLE and LOAD states are common to all FSMs. From the LOAD state, depending on the
curve selected, the FSM moves into one of the 3 collections of states (one for each type of
curve) to perform the main loop of the ECPM and the inversion setup state. Subsequently, the
FSM performs finite field inversion. The choice of the inversion algorithm will be discussed
later in this section. From the inversion states, the FSM moves to the FINAL states to
complete the coordinate conversion and move to the common WAIT state to complete the
ECPM operation.
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Figure 5.5: FSM of the Scalable and Unified ECP.
The sub-FSMs of the PRIME, KOBLITZ and RANDOM clouds in Figure 5.5 are shown
in Figure 5.6 and the instructions executed are shown in Table 5.2, Table 5.3 and Table 5.4,
respectively. Notice that the instructions of the scalable and unified ECP presented in this
section are slightly different from the instructions shown in previous sections. The modifica-
tions minimize the number of AR block operations that are executed for each MULT block
operation. By doing so, the latency is reduced when the tMULT:tAR ratio is low for lower bit
lengths.
In order to select the algorithm to use for inversion in the Scalable and Unified ECP, the
inversion algorithms described in Section 2.3 are analyzed using the architecture of the finite
field arithmetic blocks described above. The algorithms that are taken into consideration are
the binary inversion algorithm for both binary and prime fields, the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm for
binary fields, and using Fermat’s Little Theorem for prime fields.
The binary inversion algorithm has been previously used for the prime ECP in Chapter 4.
By carefully analyzing Algorithm 2.6, one can notice that after both inner while loops exit,
both u and v are odd numbers. Thus, after the subtraction of u← u− v or v ← v − u, only
one of u or v is an even number. Therefore, only one of the inner while loops is entered at
each iteration of the outer while loop. Furthermore, during each iteration of the inner while
loop, u or v is divided by 2, reducing its bit length by 1. Since the outer while loop exits
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Table 5.2: Instructions executed in the PRIME states of the Scalable and Unified
ECP
MULT PC MULT AR PC AR
PDBLP State
0 Z1 × Z1 0 Y1 = M |0 + Y1|0− Y1|R
1 T3 = R 1 + 0− 0
1 T3|R× Z1 0 T1 = M + 0− 0
1 T2 = 0 +X1 −R
2 Y1 × Y1 0 Z1 = M + 0− 0
1 T1 = T1 +X1 − 0
3 T1|R× T2 0 T1 = M + 0− 0
1 T3 = R 2 + 0− 0
4 T3|R×X1 0 R = M + 0− 0
1 T2 = R 1 +R− 0
5 T2|R× T2|R 0 T3 = M + 0− 0
1 X1 = R 1 + 0− 0
6 T1 × T1 0 X1 = M + 0−X1|R
1 T1 = 0 + T3 −R
7 T1|R× T2 0 R = M + 0− 0
1 Y1 = R 3 + 0− 0
PADDP State
0 Z1 × Z1 0 Y1 = M + 0− Y1|R
1 0 T1 = M + 0− 0
2 Z1 ×R 0
3 T1 × x 0 T2 = M + 0− 0
4 T2 × y 0 T1 = M + 0−X1
5 T1 × Z1 0 T2 = M + 0− Y1
6 T1 × T1 0 Z1 = M + 0− 0
7 0 T3 = M + 0− 0
8 X1 ×R 0
9 T3 × T1 0 T3 = M + 0− 0
1 T1 = R 1 + 0− 0
10 T2 × T2 0 X1 = M + 0− 0
1 T1 = T1 +R− 0
11 X1 × Y1 0 X1 = M + 0− T1|R
1 T3 = 0 + T3 −R
12 T3|R× T2 0 Y1 = M + 0− 0
INVSP State
0 0 Y1 = M + 0− Y1|R
when u = 1 or v = 1, the outer while loop executes at most 2m iterations, where m is the bit
length. Using the instructions provided in Table 4.4, the binary inversion algorithm requires
tBININV = 2m(2tSHIFT + tAR + 2tAR), where tSHIFT = s+ 1 is the latency of the right-shift by
1 operation and s is the number of 32-bit digits. Using the binary inversion algorithm for
binary fields, the same analysis can be performed and yields the same expression for latency.
The Itoh-Tsujii algorithm for inversion in binary fields has been previously discussed in
Section 2.3.1 and it is used by the binary ECPs described in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3.
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Table 5.3: Instructions executed in the KOBLITZ states of the Scalable and Unified
ECP
MULT PC MULT AR PC AR
PDAK State
0 x× Z1|R 0 Y1 = M |0 + Y1 + 0
1 T2 = Z
2
1 + 0 + 0
2 X1 = X
2
1 + 0 + 0
1 T2 × y|xy 0 T1 = M +X1|R + 0
1 Y1 = Y
2
1 + 0 + 0
2 T1 × Z1 0 X1 = M + Y1|R + 0
1 T1 = T
2
1 + 0 + 0
3 0 Z1 = M + 0 + 0
4 X1 ×R 0 Y1 = 0 +R + T2|0
1 Z1 = Z
2
1 + 0 + 0
5 Y1 × T1 0 T2 = M + 0 + 0
1 X1 = X
2
1 + 0 + 0
6 x× Z1 0 X1 = M +X1|R + T2
1 T1 = Z
2
1 + 0 + 0
7 T1|R× xy|y 0 T3 = M +X1 + 0
1 T2 = 0 + T2 + Z1
8 T3 × T2|R 0 Y1 = M + 0 + 0
1 Z1 = Z
2
1 + 0 + 0
PDBLK State
0 0 Y1 = M |0 + Y1 + 0
1 X1 = X
2
1 + 0 + 0
2 Y1 = Y
2
1 + 0 + 0
3 Z1 = Z
2
1 + 0 + 0
INVSK State
0 0 Y1 = M |0 + Y1 + 0
Analyzing the example shown in Equation (2.27), one can see that the latency of the Itoh-
Tsujii algorithm requires (m − 1) squaring operations and blog2 (m− 1)c + H(m − 1) − 1
multiplications, where H(x) is the Hamming weight of the value x. Using the MULT and
AR blocks described in this section, the squaring operation is performed by the AR block
and each multiplication requires a MULT block operation for integer multiplication and
an AR block operation for reduction. Thus, the latency of the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm is
tITAINV = (m− 1)tAR + (blog2 (m− 1)c+H(m− 1)− 1)(tMULT + tAR).
Using Fermat’s Little Theorem for prime field inversion transforms the inversion operation
into a−1 (mod p) = ap−2 (mod p). One method of evaluating exponentiation is by using the
square-and-multiply algorithm, similar to the double-and-add algorithm for multiplication.
By doing so, the number of squaring and multiplications required depends on the binary
representation of the value p − 2, and can be evaluated with (m − 1) squarings and H(p −
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Table 5.4: Instructions executed in the RANDOM states of the Scalable and Unified
ECP
MULT PC MULT AR PC AR
INITR State
0 0 Z2 = x
2 + 0 + 0
1 X2 = R
2 + 0 + b
LOOPR State
0 X1|X2 × Z2|Z1 0 X2|X1 = M |R + T2|0 + 0
1 R = (Z1|Z2)2 + 0 + 0
2 T3 = R
2 + 0 + 0
1 X2|X1 × Z1|Z2 0 T2 = M + 0 + 0
2 X1|X2 × Z1|Z2 0 T1 = M + 0 + 0
1 Z2|Z1 = 0 +R + T2
3 T2 × T1 0 R = M + 0 + 0
1 Z1|Z2 = R2 + 0 + 0
2 Z2|Z1 = (Z2|Z1)2 + 0 + 0
4 b× T3 0 T2 = M + 0 + 0
1 R = (X1|X2)2 + 0 + 0
2 T3 = R
2 + 0 + 0
5 x× Z2|Z1 0 X1|X2 = M + T3|R + 0
INVSR State
0 x× Z1 0 X2|X1 = M + T2 + 0
1 x× Z2 0 Z1 = M + 0 + 0
1 T1 = 0 +R +X1
2 Z1 × Z2 0 T2 = M + 0 + 0
1 X2 = 0 +R +X2
3 X1 × T2 0 Z1 = M + 0 + 0
4 X2 × T1 0 X2 = M + 0 + 0
5 T1 × Z2 0 X1 = M + 0 + 0
6 x×X1 0 Z2 = M + 0 + 0
7 0 X1 = M + 0 + 0
2) − 1 multiplications. Using the MULT and AR blocks in prime field, both squaring and
multiplication are evaluated using the MULT block followed by an AR block operation for
reduction. Thus, the latency of inversion using Fermat’s Little Theorem is tFERMAT = (m−
1)(tMULT + tAR) + (H(p− 2)− 1)(tMULT + tAR).
Table 5.5 shows the latencies in number of clock cycles of the inversion algorithms dis-
cussed. The ratio column provides the ratio of the binary inversion algorithm to the Itoh-
Tsujii algorithm in binary fields and Fermat’s Little Theorem in prime fields. From Table 5.5,
one can obverse that the binary inversion algorithm is worse than its counterpart for every
value of m except for 521-bit prime field. Furthermore, the latency of the Itoh-Tsujii algo-
rithm is over a factor of 6 less than the binary inversion algorithm. The main reason that
the difference is not as significant in prime fields is because squaring is performed using the
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Table 5.5: Latency comparison of the inversion algorithms
m tITAINV tFERMAT tBININV Ratio
Prime Fields
192 n/a 21660 31872 1.47
224 n/a 29815 40768 1.37
256 n/a 29796 50688 1.70
384 n/a 92400 100608 1.09
521 n/a 230658 178182 0.77
Binary Fields
163 4239 n/a 27058 6.38
233 7044 n/a 46134 6.55
283 9168 n/a 60562 6.61
409 16724 n/a 113702 6.80
571 29949 n/a 204418 6.83
MULT block in prime fields and requires a reduction step.
From these observations, the Scalable and Unified ECP chooses to use the Itoh-Tsujii
algorithm for inversion in binary fields and Fermat’s Little Theorem for inversion in prime
fields. The sub-FSM of the inversion states are shown in Figure 5.7 and the instructions exe-
cuted are shown in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7. The sub-FSM of the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm shown
in Figure 5.7(a) resembles the inversion states in the ECPs described in Section 3.3. The
ISQB state executes squaring and the IMULTB and IMULTRB states execute the multiplica-
tion. The sub-FSM for inversion based on Fermat’s Little Theorem shown in Figure 5.7(b) is
very similar to the one for Itoh-Tsujii, except it requires an extra state to perform reduction
for squaring. Finally, the instructions executed for the FINAL states for each of the 3 types
of curves are shown in Table 5.8. These states complete the coordinate conversion.
The FPGA implementation result of the Scalable and Unified ECP is shown in Table 5.9.
It can be seen that 25 DSP48E slices are used, which includes 4 in each ‘×’ block of the
MULT block, 4 in the add/accum/shift block and 13 in the AR block. The maximum clock
frequency of the Scalable and Unified ECP is 155.35 MHz, which is lower than in the 1-
MULT Koblitz ECP, 1-MULT Random ECP and Prime ECP. The lower clock frequency is
expected since the hardware is more complex with the combination of binary and prime field
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Table 5.6: Instructions executed in the BINARY INVERSION states of the Scalable
and Unified ECP
MULT PC MULT AR PC AR
ISQB State
0 0 T1|R = (Z1|R)2 + 0 + 0
IMULTB State
0 R× Z1|T1 0
IMULTRB State
0 0 T1 = M + 0 + 0
Table 5.7: Instructions executed in the PRIME INVERSION states of the Scalable
and Unified ECP
MULT PC MULT AR PC AR
ISQP State
0 Z1|R× Z1|R 0
ISQRP State
0 0 R = M + 0 + 0
IMULTP State
0 R× Z1 0
IMULTRP State
0 0 T1 = M + 0 + 0
operations.
In general, it is expected that the Scalable and Unified ECP has lower performance than
the previously described scalable ECPs that only support 1 of the 3 types of curves, since the
underlying finite field arithmetic units must support both binary and prime fields, whereas
the scalable ECPs only support one of the fields. Comparing the efficiency values of the
Scalable and Unified ECP in Koblitz and pseudo-random mode with the results in Table 3.7
and Table 3.10 confirms this expectation. However, in prime curves mode, the efficiency of
the Scalable and Unified ECP outperforms the Prime ECP described in Chapter 4. The
reason for the improved performance of the Scalable and Unified ECP is due to the use of
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Table 5.8: Instructions executed in FINAL states of the Scalable and Unified ECP
MULT PC MULT AR PC AR
FINALP State
0 R×R 0
1 0 T2 = M + 0− 0
2 X1 ×R 0
3 T1 × T2 0 T1 = M + 0− 0
4 0 R = M + 0− 0
5 Y1 ×R 0
6 0 T2 = M + 0− 0
FINALK State
0 X1 ×R 0 T3 = R2 + 0 + 0
1 T3 × Y1 0 T1 = M + 0 + 0
2 0 T2 = M + 0 + 0
FINALR State
0 R×X1 0 T3 = x2 + y + 0
1 T1 × Z2 0 T3 = M + T3 + 0
2 X2 × T1 0 T1 = M + 0 + 0
3 T1 × T3 0 T1 = M + 0 + 0
4 0 T2 = M + y + 0
the dual 32-bit multiplier in the MULT block instead of a 17-bit multiplier, which reduces
the latency of the MULT block operation considerably.
Table 5.9 also shows the implementation results of some designs in the current literature.
As previously mentioned, there is no work in the current literature that implements all 15
NIST recommended curves in a single hardware device. Thus, the comparison with other
designs is not entirely fair, but are included in for reference purposes. The designs in [30]
and [29] show ECPs that are unified but not scalable.
In [30], the authors propose a unified ECP architecture using multiple word-based arith-
metic units (AU) that consist of a unified multiplier and a unified adder. Since [30] uses an
older FPGA (Virtex-II Pro vs Virtex-5), the comparison is not completely fair. However,
Table 5.9 shows that the latency and the number of slices used in the Scalable and Unified
ECP is lower than in [30]. The higher number of slices in [30] is due to the use of 4 AUs each
with a multiplier and an adder, whereas the Scalable and Unifeid ECP only has 1 MULT
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Table 5.9: Implementation Results and Comparison of the Scalable and Unified ECP
Work FPGA Reg. LUT Slices BRAM DSP
Max.
Freq.
(MHz)
Curve m
Latency
(ms)
Efficiency(
ECPM
s·slice
)
Scalable
and
Unified
ECP
Virtex-5 4,244 8,316 2,291 5 25 155.35
Prime
192 0.857 0.510
224 1.127 0.387
256 1.378 0.317
384 3.922 0.111
521 9.662 0.045
Koblitz
163 0.239 1.825
233 0.399 1.094
283 0.533 0.818
409 1.185 0.368
571 2.643 0.165
Pseudo-
Random
163 0.365 1.195
233 0.646 0.676
283 0.870 0.502
409 1.866 0.234
571 4.523 0.097
Lai and
Huang
[30]
Virtex-II
Pro
n/a n/a
39,531
n/a n/a 94.7
Prime
160 0.782 0.032
40,219 192 1.25 0.020
41,595 256 2.66 0.009
39,531 Binary 160 0.574 0.044
Wang
et al.
[29]
Virtex-4 n/a n/a
5,227
CLBs
n/a n/a 150.5
Prime 192 0.542 0.353a
Pseudo-
Random
163 0.347 0.551a
Ananyi
et al.
[42]
Virtex-4 n/a 31,946 20,793 1 32 60 Prime
192 4.8 0.010
224 5.8 0.008
256 6.9 0.007
384 19.9 0.002
521 45.6 0.001
Hassan &
Benaissa
[39]
Spartan-3 913 2028 1278 4 0 90 Koblitz
163 15.5 0.050
283 45.1 0.017
571 121.4 0.006
Hassan &
Benaissa
[17]
Spartan-3 650 2025 1127 4 0 68
Pseudo-
Random
163 38 0.023
233 73.4 0.012
283 104 0.009
409 251 0.004
571 287.4 0.003
a Assumes only 1 slice is used per CLB.
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and 1 AR block.
The design in [29] is a unified ECP that can perform both RSA and ECC operations. The
reported ECP is able to compute ECPM for a 192-bit prime curve, 163-bit pseudo-random
curve and 1024-bit RSA. It implements a separate modular inversion unit to evaluate the
binary inversion algorithm. Since only the configurable logic block (CLB) information is
given in [29], the efficiency metric assumes that each CLB only uses 1 of the 4 slices, which
is underestimated. Even though the ECP in [29] has a lower latency for P-192 and B-163,
the results in Table 5.9 show that [29] has a lower efficiency compared to the scalable and
unified ECP, and it does not support the other NIST recommended curves with larger bit
lengths.
Other researchers presented works on scalable ECPs that are not unified. These works
have been previously shown in Table 3.2, Table 3.3 and Table 4.5, but are shown again in
Table 3.2 for comparison with the Scalable and Unified ECP. In [42], the authors present
an ECC processor that supports all 5 NIST recommended prime curves. The design uses
a wide datapath, which results in a slow maximum clock frequency of only 60 MHz and a
large number of slices. Even though the Scalable and Unified ECP supports binary curves in
addition to prime curves, it still outperforms the design in [42] in both timing performance
and area. Furthermore, the Scalable and Unifeid ECP supports all 15 NIST recommended
curves with 25 DSP slices, whereas the design in [42] uses 32 DSP slices to support only the
5 prime curves.
In [39] and [17], the authors have designed ECPs for Koblitz and pseudo-random curves
for area-constrained environments. The Spartan-3 is an older FPGA, so the comparison is not
completely fair. However, the low maximum frequency and the high number of clock cycles
due to the use of Hardware/Software Co-design (HSC) result in very long latencies compared
to the Scalable and Unified ECP. These comparisons demonstrate high performance of the
Scalable and Unified ECP.
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MicroBlaze Scalable and Unified ECP
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Figure 5.8: Block diagram of the interface between the Microblaze and the ECP.
5.2 Hardware/Software Co-design
This section describes the interfacing of the Scalable and Unified ECP described in Section 5.1
with software. In particular, this section describes the implementation of the ECP with the
soft-core Microblaze microprocessor available in Xilinx FPGAs.
A soft-core processor is one that is implemented using FPGA fabric, so it is extremely
flexible and can be configured to suit the user’s needs. Xilinx provides software packages to
very easily integrate the Microblaze into the FPGA and interface it with custom hardware
designs. The goal of the design in this section is to set up a platform for future extensions
in developing a protocol accelerator using the Scalable and Unified ECP developed in the
previous section.
The top level block diagram of the interface between the Miroblaze soft-core processor
and the Scalable and Unified ECP is shown in Figure 5.8. The connection between the two
blocks is a Fast Simple Link described in [69]. The FSL is a one-directional communication
link available in the Xilinx IP catalog to provide fast communication between modules. The
architecture of the FSL is a FIFO with various control signals associated. The block digram
of the FSL is shown in Figure 5.9 [69].
The FSL has a master and a slave side and data always flows from the master to the slave.
The ‘FSL M Clk’ and ‘FSL S Clk’ ports are independent clock signals for the master and
slave sides. In the current design, the same clock is used to operate the Microblaze and the
ECP to simplify the design. The ‘FSL M Data’ and ‘FSL S Data’ ports are set to 32 bits by
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Figure 5.9: Block diagram of Xilinx Fast Simplex Link (FSL) [69].
the Microblaze by default. These are used to pass data through the FSL. Data is input from
the master by asserting the ‘FSL M Write’ flag and stored in the FIFO. The slave side reads
the data by asserting the ‘FSL S Read’ flag. The ‘FSL M Control’ and ‘FSL S Control’ ports
are used to transmit a 1-bit signal from the master to the slave to indicate that the contents
in the ‘FSL S Data’ port are used for control purposes. This feature allows the master to
send 2 types of information to the slave (i.e. raw data or control signals) using the same
‘FSL M Data’ port.
Using 2 FSLs to connect the Microblaze to the ECP allows the ECP to act as a co-
processor to the Microblaze. When an ECPM operation is required, the Microblaze calls a
function to pass arguments to FSL0 to the ECP, where the Microblaze is the master and
the ECP is the slave. This function must first send a control signal to configure the ECP to
the appropriate mode (i.e. the type of curve and the bit length). Subsequently, the function
transmits values required for ECPM operation (i.e. the x- and y-coordinates of the point,
P , and the scalar multiplier, k) to the FSL as 32-bit digits. If Koblitz curves are selected,
the value of k is expected to be τNAF converted and the input is separated into magnitude
and sign. The ECP evalutes the ECPM and writes the resultant affine coordinates to FSL1,
where the ECP is the master and the Microblaze is the slave. These values are also passed
as 32-bit digits. When the Microblaze is ready, it may read the result from the FSL. During
the time that the ECPM is evaluated by the ECP, the Microblaze is free to perform other
functions.
Since the Scalable and Unified ECP shown in Figure 5.4 expects the inputs ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘k’ and
‘ks’ simultaneously, a wrapper module is used to collect the values from the FSL and input
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into the ECP. Similarly, the outputs ‘x2’ and ‘y2’ also require a wrapper module to package
the values accordingly. Since both the ECP and the FSL operate in 32-bit digits, the wrapper
module is simply a collection of FIFOs to collect the input and output values. Having the
Scalable and Unified ECP connected to the MicroBlaze processor, the development of other
protocol level algorithms, such as the ECDH or ECDSA, may be implemented in software
while taking advantage of the high performance ECP.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In today’s society, network security is becoming growingly important with the increased
reliance on the computers to exchange secret information. The increased amount of encrypted
data transmitted across networks also demands more efficient implementations of security
protocols to handle the higher network traffic while maintaining security. Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) is regarded as an excellent successor to the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) algorithm for public-key cryptography due to the level of security it can provide with
much smaller key sizes. Reduced key sizes mean implementations of ECC can be much faster
and use fewer resources than the respective RSA implementation to provide the same level of
security. Hardware accelerators are commonly used to improve the performance of servers by
offloading computationally intensive ECC operations to hardware. By doing so, the server’s
capabilities to respond to a high volume of requests increase and the server’s processors
can handle other operations more efficiently. The operations that are offloaded can range
from simply moving the finite field operations to hardware or implementing a complete ECC
scheme, such as ECDSA, in hardware.
This thesis focuses mainly on the elliptic curves recommended by NIST [18] as these
are the most commonly used curves in other standards and protocols, such as SECG [19],
and FIPS 186-3 [20]. NIST recommends a total of 15 curves and they are divided into 3
categories: binary pseudo-random curves, binary Koblitz curves and prime curves. Each of
these categories can take advantage of different algorithms to compute the elliptic curve point
multiplication (ECPM) operation, which is the most important computation in ECC.
In this thesis, the hardware implementation of various scalable elliptic curve processors
(ECP) have been explored. Scalability refers to the design of an ECP that can compute
the elliptic curve point multiplication (ECPM) in hardware and support multiple curves on-
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the-fly without the need to reconfigure the hardware. On server-side applications, highly
scalable and high throughput implementations of ECPs are desired since servers must be
able to handle a variety of security levels and must be able to respond to requests quickly.
Thus, the designs in this thesis are more suitable for high-end server-side applications. This
thesis also implements a scalable and unified ECP, where unified is defined as the ability to
support both binary and prime fields using the same hardware.
As shown throughout this thesis, the efficiency and performance of a scalable ECP is
highly dependent on the implementation of the underlying finite field arithmetic units. Thus,
in this thesis, much of the attention is focused on designing efficient finite field arithmetic
blocks. Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 describe the architecture of these ECPs.
• The ECPs in Chapter 3 target the binary curves recommended by NIST [18].
• The design in Section 3.1 shows a ECP specific to the 163 pseudo-random curve rec-
ommended by NIST. The design has extremely low latency, but uses a large amount of
hardware resources for only 1 type of curve. This work is published in [50]. This section
shows that the ECP implementation of extremely low latencies is possible with a high
usage of hardware resources. However, if the same architecture is used to implement
scalable ECPs, the hardware resource utilization would be extremely high and would
not fit in a single FPGA. The use of multiple FPGAs would increase the cost of the
implementation.
• The designs in Section 3.2 are scalable ECPs for Koblitz and pseudo-random curves.
The latencies are higher than the 163-bit ECP, but the hardware utilization is controlled
by resource sharing among different bit lengths. Namely, the finite field arithmetic unit
(FFAU) is designed to support all 5 binary fields recommended by NIST. These ECPs
are published in [51] and [52]. The main drawback of these ECPs is that the reduction
step of both multiplication and squaring is performed in every operation. In addition,
only a single FFAU is used in the ECP. Thus, the latencies can be further reduced by
exploring the parallelization of the multiplication and the ECPM operations.
• Section 3.3 presents binary field ECPs that parallelize the instructions of the ECPM
by deploying a MULT and an AR block, and parallelize the multiplication by using two
multipliers in the MULT block. These improvements result in binary ECPs with much
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better efficiencies. The work related to these ECPs has been submitted for peer review
in [67]. Despite the reduced latencies, longer latencies are observed for larger key sizes
due to the use of the Comba algorithm, which has a latency in the order of O(s2), where
s is the number of digits in the multiplication. Thus, the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm
is used in the Low Latency ECPs to improve the performance when using large key
sizes.
• The architecture in Section 3.4 reduces the latencies of the ECP for higher bit lengths by
using a wider datapath and the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm. The ECPs in this section
are published in [53]. These ECPs have lower latencies compared to the Parallelized
ECPs, but require more slices. Nevertheless, they show to be more efficient than the
Parallelized ECPs for larger key sizes.
• Using the experience from the binary ECPs, Chapter 4 describes the Prime ECP that
uses a similar processor architecture as the binary ECPs but support the 5 prime curves
recommended by NIST. This work is published in [54]. Taking advantage of the high
performance Xilinx DSP48E slices, the Prime ECP increases the efficiency of the ECP
compared to a reference design in the current literature. The improved performance can
be attributed to the smaller datapath, which decreases the number of slices required
and increases the maximum frequency of the design. Furthermore, despite the usage
of Xilinx DSP48E slices in the implemented ECP, the architecture is portable and
may be modified to utilize DSP slices in newer Xilinx FPGAs or FPGAs from other
manufacturers, such as Altera.
• The Scalable and Unified ECP described in Section 5.1 combines the ECPs previously
developed and has the ability to support all 15 curves recommended by NIST without
the need to reconfigure the hardware. This work has been submitted for peer review
in [68]. The implementation results of the Scalable and Unified ECP show an improve-
ment over the Prime ECP due to the use of 32-bit datapath instead of 17-bit datapath
in the MULT block. However, the Scalable and Unified ECP is not as efficient as the
Parallelized ECPs in Section 3.3. This result is expected since the hardware implemen-
tation of binary field arithmetic is more efficient than prime fields in hardware. Thus,
the Parallelized ECPs that only implement binary field arithmetic should be more effi-
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cient than the Scalable and Unified ECP, since it must accommodate both prime and
binary field arithmetic.
• Finally, the ECP is interfaced with the Microblaze soft-core processor as described
in Section 5.2. The integration with software demonstrates the concept of offloading
the computationally intensive ECPM operation to a hardware accelerator. The resul-
tant designs also provide a platform for future development of implementing various
protocols that can take advantage of the Scalable and Unified ECP.
The main contributions of this thesis are the implementations of the scalable and unified
finite field arithmetic blocks that are carefully designed to support various prime and binary
field operations. The architecture of the arithmetic blocks and the realization of the ECPM
algorithms have been studied and various methods have been investigated to improve the
performance of the ECPs. These methods include: the parallelization of the arithmetic and
the ECPM algorithm; the use of different algorithms for multiplication, squaring, reduction
and inversion; and the use of DSP slices on FPGAs. The improvement in the finite field
arithmetic blocks contribute to the improved efficiency of the overall ECPs.
The implementations described in this thesis can be easily integrated into servers or act as
a stand-alone system-on-chip in the development of secure network systems. It can support
all 15 curves recommended by NIST without the need to reconfigure the hardware and the
operations can be done at high speeds. Since the entire implementation of ECC operations
and schemes is enclosed in a single FPGA, the design is highly portable and can be migrated
to newer and more advanced FPGAs in the future. The techniques used to design the finite
field arithmetic blocks can also be used in other application where finite field arithmetic is
required, such as error correction codes.
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Chapter 7
Future Work
This chapter describes some potential future work that extends from the current work
described in this thesis. Section 7.1 discusses the τNAF conversion algorithms in more detail
and the possible integration with the scalable and unified ECP. Section 7.2 discusses the
topic of post-quantum cryptography. Section 7.3 discusses identity-based encryption (IBE).
7.1 Koblitz τNAF Conversion
In the Koblitz ECPs in Chapter 3 and Scalable and Unified ECP in Koblitz mode described
in Section 5.1, the input for the value of k is assumed to have been converted from binary
to τ -adic non-adjacent-form (τNAF). The reason for the exclusion of the evaluation of the
conversion in the ECP is because the main goal of this thesis is in the design and imple-
mentation of the ECP to evaluate the ECPM operation. Furthermore, as explained in [70],
for some cryptosystems, a random τNAF number can be generated for use in the ECPM.
Nevertheless, as a potential future work to this thesis, the inclusion of the τNAF converter
in either software or hardware can extend the capabilities of the ECP.
Solinas [58] describes an algorithm for τNAF conversion and is shown in Algorithm 7.1.
In the algorithm, µ = (−1)1−a, where a is defined in Equation (2.4). Solinas [58] shows that
if Algorithm 7.1 is used by setting r0 = k and r1 = 0, the Hamming weight of the resultant
τNAF converted k is 2m/3, where m is the bit length of k. Using a simple double-and-
add ECPM algorithm would require m/2 PADD. Thus, by using the τNAF converted k,
the PDBL operations are replaced by PFRB operations, which are simply squarings, at the
expense of the increase in PADD operations. This trade-off is undesirable, so [58] shows a
method of modifying the value of k prior to applying Algorithm 7.1.
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Algorithm 7.1 τNAF conversion algorithm
Input: integers r0 and r1
Output: τNAF(r0 + r1τ)
c0 ← r0, c1 ← r1, S ← 〈〉
while c0 6= 0 or c1 6= 0 do
if c0 is odd then
u← 2− (c0 − 2c1 mod 4)
c0 ← c0 − u
else
u← 0
end if
Prepend u to S
(c0, c1)← (c1 + µc0/2,−c0/2)
end while
return S
Solinas [58] shows that given δ = (τm − 1)/(τ − 1), if γ = ρ (mod δ), then γP = ρP .
Therefore, in terms of the ECPM operation, γ and ρ are equivalent. Thus, the reduced τNAF
conversion algorithm evaluates ρ = k mod δ followed by S = τNAF(ρ). By doing so, Solinas
shows that the Hamming weight of S is approximately m/3.
As pointed out in [70], one of the drawbacks of the reduced τNAF algorithm proposed by
Solinas [58] is the complex multiplications and divisions required for the (mod δ) operation.
In [58], it also shows that if γ = ρ (mod τm− 1), then γP = ρP . In [70], the authors explain
that by taking (mod τm − 1) instead of (mod δ), the reduction algorithm can be greatly
simplified by the following:
k = (d0 + d1)τ
m + b0 + b1τ
= (d0 + d1τ)(τ
m − 1) + b0 + d0 + (b1 + d1)τ
(7.1)
Thus, the reduction of k (mod τm−1) = (b0+d0)+(b1+d1)τ can be evaluated by repeatedly
dividing k by τ and rearranging the coefficients of the quotient and remainder. Since the
division by τ only involves additions and divisions by 2, its implementation is much simpler
compared to the reduction proposed in [58]. The authors in [70] explain that using this
reduction algorithm, named lazy reduction, followed by the τNAF conversion algorithm in
Algorithm 7.1, the maximum length of the converted value is m+ 4.
The work in [71] further improves on the performance of the work in [70] by developing
the double lazy reduction and double τNAF algorithm that generates 2 τNAF converted
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digits of k at a time. By doing so, the hardware implementation of [71] can complete the
conversion in almost half of the time as in [70].
The implementations provided in [70] and [71] are made for 1 specific curve at a time.
By adopting these τNAF conversion techniques and the scalable finite field arithmetic de-
scribed in this thesis, a scalable τNAF converter can be implemented to further improve the
capabilities of the ECP.
7.2 Post-Quantum Cryptography
Post-quantum cryptography refers to a branch of cryptography that focuses on the cryp-
tographic algorithms that are still secure with the birth of quantum computers. The first
paragraph in [72] describes post-quantum cryptography very adequately by posing the ques-
tions:
“Imagine that its fifteen years from now and someone announces the successful
construction of a large quantum computer. The New York Times runs a front-
page article reporting that all of the public-key algorithms used to protect the
Internet have been broken. Users panic. What exactly will happen to cryptogra-
phy?”
In [72], the authors explain that using certain quantum algorithms, such as Shor’s al-
gorithm or Grover’s algorithm, many of the most popular public-key cryptography can be
broken with the existence of a quantum computer. However, there are several classes of
algorithms that current research has shown to be unaffected by these quantum algorithms:
• Hash-based cryptography
• Code-based cryptography
• Lattice-based cryptography
• Multivariate-quadratic equations cryptography
• Secret-key cryptography
One of the reasons these algorithms are not currently in use is the efficiency of the al-
gorithm. In [72], the authors explain that in order to provide a similar level of security
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as a few-thousand-bit RSA, the McEliece algorithm (example of a code-based cryptogra-
phy) requires close to a million bits. Thus, research in post-quantum cryptography involves
improving the efficiency of currently known algorithms that are resistant against quantum
algorithms.
In particular, code-based cryptography is based on binary linear codes that are commonly
used in communications for error correction. Recent works in [73, 74, 75] have shown archi-
tectures implemented on FPGAs for the McEliece cryptography. Since binary linear codes
are based on binary field operations, it may be possible to use some of the techniques and
architectures for the finite field arithmetic blocks described in this thesis.
7.3 Identity-Based Encryption
Identity-based encryption (IBE) was originally proposed by Shamir in 1984 [76]. The main
idea of the scheme is the ability to encrypt a message by using an arbitrary string. The
original motivation was to be implemented on e-mail systems, where the intended recipient’s
email address is to be used as the public key. In order for the intended recipient to decrypt
the message, he or she requests a private key from a trusted third party, called the Private
Key Generator (PKG), and uses the private key to decrypt the received message.
IBE involves the use of 4 algorithms:
• Setup: The PKG runs this algorithm to set up the environment and generate the
master key that is used to derive the users’ private keys.
• Extract: This algorithm uses the master key and the arbitrary string used in the
encryption to generate the private key for the user.
• Encrypt: This algorithm generates the ciphertext using the arbitrary string and the
message to be encrypted.
• Decrypt: This algorithm returns the original message using the private key generated
from the Extract algorithm and the ciphertext generated from the Encrypt algorithm.
In [77], the authors propose the use of Weil pairings on elliptic curves in the implemen-
tation of IBE. In [78], the authors also make use of pairings on elliptic curves to realize IBE.
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Similar to the ECPM operation, the algorithms used for IBE are also defined over finite field
arithmetic. These operations involve a similar set of instructions as the ones implemented by
the scalable and unified finite field arithmetic blocks described in this thesis. Furthermore,
IBE using pairing-based cryptography schemes operate on prime [79], binary [80] or ternary
fields [81]. This thesis has shown an efficient implementation of combining prime and binary
fields on the same device. The finite field arithmetic blocks may be further extended to
ternary fields to support efficient implementations of IBE as the design in [82].
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Appendix A
Binary Fields Reduction Algorithms
The following algorithms are modified from [55] and are used for binary finite field re-
duction. The algorithms split the operand, Z, into 32-bit digits and it is modified to output
the result least-significant-digit-first (LSD-first) instead of most-significant-digit-first (MSD-
first). In the algorithms, ⊕ is modulo 2 addition, (A,B,C) represents a concatenation of A,
B, and C, >> and << represents right shift and left shift operations, & is a bit-wise logical
AND operation and ‘0x’ precedes a hexadecimal number.
Algorithm A.1 Reduction by P (t) = t163 + t7 + t6 + t3 + 1
Input: Z = (Z11, . . . , Z1, Z0)
Output: Z mod P (t) = (Z5, . . . , Z1, Z0)
for i from 6 to 11 do
if i ≤ 9 then
(Zi−4, Zi−5, Zi−6) = (Zi−4, Zi−5, Zi−6)⊕(Zi << 29)⊕(Zi << 32)⊕(Zi << 35)⊕(Zi <<
36)
else if i = 10 then
(T0, Z5, Z4) = (0, Z5, Z4)⊕ (Zi << 29)⊕ (Zi << 32)⊕ (Zi << 35)⊕ (Zi << 36)
(Z2, Z1, Z0) = (Z2, Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 29)⊕ (T0 << 32)⊕ (T0 << 35)⊕ (T0 << 36)
else // i = 11
(T1, T0, Z5) = (0, 0, Z5)⊕ (Zi << 29)⊕ (Zi << 32)⊕ (Zi << 35)⊕ (Zi << 36)
(Z2, Z1, Z0) = (Z2, Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 29)⊕ (T0 << 32)⊕ (T0 << 35)⊕ (T0 << 36)
(Z3, Z2, Z1) = (Z3, Z2, Z1)⊕ (T1 << 29)⊕ (T1 << 32)⊕ (T1 << 35)⊕ (T1 << 36)
end if
end for
// Final reduction
T = Z5 >> 3
Z0 = Z0 ⊕ (T << 7)⊕ (T << 6)⊕ (T << 3)⊕ T
Z1 = Z1 ⊕ (T >> 25)⊕ (T >> 26)
Z5 = Z5 & 0x7
return Z = (Z5, . . . , Z1, Z0)
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Algorithm A.2 Reduction by P (t) = t233 + t74 + 1
Input: Z = (Z15, . . . , Z1, Z0)
Output: Z mod P (t) = (Z7, . . . , Z1, Z0)
for i from 8 to 15 do
if i ≤ 11 then
(Zi−4, Zi−5, Zi−6, Zi−7, Zi−8) = (Zi−4, Zi−5, Zi−6, Zi−7, Zi−8)⊕(Zi << 23)⊕(Zi << 97)
else if i = 12 then
(T0, Z7, Z6, Z5, Z4) = (0, Z7, Z6, Z5, Z4)⊕ (Zi << 23)⊕ (Zi << 97)
(Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0) = (Z4, Z3, 0, Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 23)⊕ (T0 << 97)
else if i = 13 then
(T1, T0, Z7, Z6, Z5) = (0, 0, Z7, Z6, Z5)⊕ (Zi << 23)⊕ (Zi << 97)
(Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0) = (Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 23)⊕ (T0 << 97)
(Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1) = (Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1)⊕ (T1 << 23)⊕ (T1 << 97)
else if i = 14 then
(T2, T1, T0, Z7, Z6) = (0, 0, 0, Z7, Z6)⊕ (Zi << 23)⊕ (Zi << 97)
(Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0) = (Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 23)⊕ (T0 << 97)
(Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1) = (Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1)⊕ (T1 << 23)⊕ (T1 << 97)
(Z6, Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2) = (Z6, Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2)⊕ (T2 << 23)⊕ (T2 << 97)
else // i = 15
(T3, T2, T1, T0, Z7) = (0, 0, 0, 0, Z7)⊕ (Zi << 23)⊕ (Zi << 97)
(Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0) = (Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 23)⊕ (T0 << 97)
(Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1) = (Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1)⊕ (T1 << 23)⊕ (T1 << 97)
(Z6, Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2) = (Z6, Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2)⊕ (T2 << 23)⊕ (T2 << 97)
(Z7, Z6, Z5, Z4, Z3) = (Z7, Z6, Z5, Z4, Z3)⊕ (T3 << 23)⊕ (T3 << 97)
end if
end for
// Final reduction
T = Z7 >> 9
Z0 = Z0 ⊕ T
Z2 = Z2 ⊕ (T << 10)
Z3 = Z3 ⊕ (T >> 22)
Z7 & 0x1FF
return Z = (Z7, . . . , Z1, Z0)
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Algorithm A.3 Reduction by P (t) = t283 + t12 + t7 + t5 + 1
Input: Z = (Z17, . . . , Z1, Z0)
Output: Z mod P (t) = (Z8, . . . , Z1, Z0)
for i from 9 to 17 do
if i ≤ 16 then
(Zi−8, Zi−9) = (Zi−8, Zi−9)⊕ (Zi << 5)⊕ (Zi << 10)⊕ (Zi << 12)⊕ (Zi << 17)
else // i = 17
(T0, Z8) = (0, Z8)⊕ (Zi << 5)⊕ (Zi << 10)⊕ (Zi << 12)⊕ (Zi << 17)
(Z1, Z0) = (Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 5)⊕ (T0 << 10)⊕ (T0 << 12)⊕ (T0 << 17)
end if
end for
// Final reduction
T = Z8 >> 27
Z0 = Z0 ⊕ T ⊕ (T << 5)⊕ (T << 7)⊕ (T << 12)
Z8 = Z8 & 0x7FFFFFF
return Z = (Z8, . . . , Z1, Z0)
Algorithm A.4 Reduction by P (t) = t409 + t87 + 1
Input: Z = (Z25, . . . , Z1, Z0)
Output: Z mod P (t) = (Z12, . . . , Z1, Z0)
for i from 13 to 25 do
if i ≤ 22 then
(Zi−10, Zi−11, Zi−12, Zi−13) = (Zi−10, Zi−11, Zi−12, Zi−13)⊕ (Zi << 7)⊕ (Zi << 94)
else if i = 23 then
(T0, Z12, Z11, Z10) = (0, Z12, Z11, Z10)⊕ (Zi << 7)⊕ (Zi << 94)
(Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0) = (Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 7)⊕ (T0 << 94)
else if i = 24 then
(T1, T0, Z12, Z11) = (0, 0, Z12, Z11)⊕ (Zi << 7)⊕ (Zi << 94)
(Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0) = (Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 7)⊕ (T0 << 94)
(Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1) = (Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1)⊕ (T1 << 7)⊕ (T1 << 94)
else // i = 25
(T2, T1, T0, Z12) = (0, 0, 0, Z12)⊕ (Zi << 7)⊕ (Zi << 94)
(Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0) = (Z3, Z2, Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 7)⊕ (T0 << 94)
(Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1) = (Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1)⊕ (T1 << 7)⊕ (T1 << 94)
(Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2) = (Z5, Z4, Z3, Z2)⊕ (T2 << 7)⊕ (T2 << 94)
end if
end for
// Final reduction
T = C12 >> 25
Z0 = Z0 ⊕ T
Z2 = Z2 ⊕ (T << 23)
Z12 = Z12 & 0x1FFFFFF
return Z = (Z12, . . . , Z1, Z0)
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Algorithm A.5 Reduction by P (t) = t571 + t10 + t5 + t2 + 1
Input: Z = (Z35, . . . , Z1, Z0)
Output: Z mod P (t) = (Z17, . . . , Z1, Z0)
for i from 18 to 35 do
if i ≤ 34 then
(Zi−17, Zi−18) = (Zi−17, Zi−18)⊕ (Zi << 5)⊕ (Zi << 7)⊕ (Zi << 10)⊕ (Zi << 15)
else // i = 35
(T0, Z17) = (0, Z17)⊕ (Zi << 5)⊕ (Zi << 7)⊕ (Zi << 10)⊕ (Zi << 15)
(Z1, Z0) = (Z1, Z0)⊕ (T0 << 5)⊕ (T0 << 7)⊕ (T0 << 10)⊕ (T0 << 15)
end if
end for
// Final reduction
T = Z17 >> 27
C0 = C0 ⊕ T ⊕ (T << 2)⊕ (T << 5)⊕ (T << 10)
C17 = C17 & 0x7FFFFFF
return Z = (Z17, . . . , Z1, Z0)
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Appendix B
Prime Fields Reduction Algorithms
The following algorithms are taken from [55] and are used for prime field reduction. The
algorithms are generated by using a similar analysis as the one shown in Section 2.3.2. In the
algorithms, values enclosed in brackets represent that the binary values are concatenated.
Furthermore, the input value c breaks down into different digit sizes. For example, if base
264 is used, the digits, ci, are 64-bit integers.
Algorithm B.1 Reduction modulo p192 = 2
192 − 264 − 1
Input: c = (c5, c4, . . . , c0) in base 2
64 with 0 ≤ c < p2192
Output: c mod p192
Define 192-bit integers:
s1 = (c2, c1, c0), s2 = (0, c3, c3),
s3 = (c4, c4, 0), s4 = (c5, c5, c5)
Return (s1 + s2 + s3 + s4 mod p192)
Algorithm B.2 Reduction modulo p224 = 2
224 − 296 + 1
Input: c = (c13, c12, . . . , c0) in base 2
32 with 0 ≤ c < p2224
Output: c mod p224
Define 224-bit integers:
s1 = (c6, c5, c4, c3, c2, c1, c0), s2 = (c10, c9, c8, c7, 0, 0, 0),
s3 = (0, c13, c12, c11, 0, 0, 0), s4 = (c13, c12, c11, c10, c9, c8, c7),
s5 = (0, 0, 0, 0, c13, c12, c11)
Return (s1 + s2 + s3 − s4 − s5 mod p224)
Algorithm B.3 Reduction modulo p256 = 2
256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1
Input: c = (c15, c14, . . . , c0) in base 2
32 with 0 ≤ c < p2256
Output: c mod p256
Define 256-bit integers:
s1 = (c7, c6, c5, c4, c3, c2, c1, c0), s2 = (c15, c14, c13, c12, c11, 0, 0, 0),
s3 = (0, c15, c14, c13, c12, 0, 0, 0), s4 = (c15, c14, 0, 0, 0, c10, c9, c8),
s5 = (c8, c13, c15, c14, c13, c11, c10, c9), s6 = (c10, c8, 0, 0, 0, c13, c12, c11),
s7 = (c11, c9, 0, 0, c15, c14, c13, c12), s8 = (c12, 0, c10, c9, c8, c15, c14, c13),
s9 = (c13, 0, c11, c10, c9, 0, c15, c14)
Return (s1 + 2s2 + 2s3 + s4 + s5 − s6 − s7 − s8 − s9 mod p256)
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Algorithm B.4 Reduction modulo p384 = 2
384 − 2128 − 296 + 232 − 1
Input: c = (c23, c22, . . . , c0) in base 2
32 with 0 ≤ c < p2384
Output: c mod p384
Define 384-bit integers:
s1 = (c11, c10, c9, c8, c7, c6, c5, c4, c3, c2, c1, c0),
s2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, c23, c22, c21, 0, 0, 0, 0),
s3 = (c23, c22, c21, c20, c19, c18, c17, c16, c15, c14, c13, c12),
s4 = (c20, c19, c18, c17, c16, c15, c14, c13, c12, c23, c22, c21),
s5 = (c19, c18, c17, c16, c15, c14, c13, c12, c20, 0, c23, 0),
s6 = (0, 0, 0, 0, c23, c22, c21, c20, 0, 0, 0, 0),
s7 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, c23, c22, c21, 0, 0, c20),
s8 = (c22, c21, c20, c19, c18, c17, c16, c15, c14, c13, c12, c23)
s9 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, c23, 0, c22, c21, c20, 0),
s10 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, c23, c23, 0, 0, 0)
Return (s1 + 2s2 + s3 + s4 + s5 + s6 + s7 − s8 − s9 − s10 mod p384)
Algorithm B.5 Reduction modulo p521 = 2
521 − 1
Input: c = (c1041, c1040, . . . , c0) in base 2 with 0 ≤ c < p2521
Output: c mod p521
Define 521-bit integers:
s1 = (c1041, c1040, . . . , c521),
s2 = (c520, c519, . . . , c0)
Return (s1 + s2 mod p521)
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